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“One major contrast between most economic analyses of globalization’s impact and those of the
broader public . . . is the focus, or lack thereof, on trade imbalances. The public tends to see trade
surpluses or deficits as determining winners and losers; the general equilibrium trade models that
underlay the 1990s’ consensus gave no role to trade imbalances at all. The economists’ approach is
almost certainly right for the long run.... Yet in the long run we are all dead, and rapid changes in
trade balances can cause serious problems of adjustment....”
Paul Krugman, “Globalization: What Did We Miss?”1
1 Introduction
A large body of evidence shows that globalization can lead to significant labor market disruption.
For instance, Autor et al. (2013) show that American workers in regions facing steeper import com-
petition from China are less likely to work in manufacturing and more likely to be unemployed.2
This work has generated considerable interest and research in understanding, modeling, and quanti-
fying the adjustment process in response to globalization shocks.3 Yet this literature has abstracted
from modeling trade imbalances, and has been silent on how such imbalances could influence the
labor market adjustment process.
This gap is puzzling in light of the size and persistence of trade imbalances over the past three
decades, coupled with an increased discomfort among American policymakers toward trade deficits.
Indeed, there is a pervasive concern among many policymakers and the public that trade deficits
are undesirable, as they crowd out domestic production and are detrimental to jobs and workers.4
When trade is balanced, equilibrium forces ensure that a contraction of import-competing sectors is
met with a simultaneous expansion of export-oriented sectors. On the other hand, if globalization
shocks induce countries to run trade imbalances, these shifts are no longer synchronized, affecting
the dynamics of reallocation. Hence, the behavior of trade imbalances can influence the dynamics
of job losses and gains, especially in the presence of unemployment and labor market frictions.
In this paper, we study how endogenizing trade imbalances influences the labor market adjust-
ment process in response to globalization. Does ignoring trade imbalances when we investigate the
labor market consequences of trade shocks matter at all? How much insight do we lose in doing so?
To address these questions, we build on existing models of globalization and labor market adjust-
ment and develop an estimable, general-equilibrium, multicountry, multisector model with three
key ingredients: 1) Consumption-saving decisions in each country are determined by the optimizing
1See Krugman (2019).
2Recent papers tying globalization shocks to labor market disruptions include Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017,
2019), Pierce and Schott (2016), Costa et al. (2016), Dauth et al. (2018), and Utar (2018), among many others.
3See Artuç et al. (2010), Dix-Carneiro (2014), Traiberman (2019), and Caliendo et al. (2019).
4For examples of recent policy discussions, see Scott (1998), Bernanke (2005), and Navarro (2019).
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behavior of representative households, leading to endogenous trade imbalances. 2) Labor market
frictions across and within sectors lead to unemployment dynamics, and to sluggish transitions to
shocks. 3) Ricardian comparative advantage forces promote trade, but geographical barriers inhibit
it.
In our model, trade imbalances arise from country-level representative households making con-
sumption and savings decisions.5 These decisions give rise to an Euler equation that dictates how
countries smooth consumption over time in response to shocks in productivity, trade costs, and
intertemporal preferences. Our approach relies neither on ad hoc rules for imbalances nor on spec-
ifying the path of imbalances exogenously, both of which are common in the international trade
literature. Instead, our perspective builds on the workhorse model of imbalances in international
macroeconomics, providing a natural benchmark for understanding how they shape the labor mar-
ket adjustment process.6
Turning to production and the labor market, workers in each country are organized into the
representative households. They choose in which sector to work, taking into account how their
choices affect the household’s maximizing problem. Similarly, firms choose in which sector to
produce, maximizing expected discounted profits. Together, a firm and worker produce tradable
intermediate varieties that are aggregated into sector-level outputs used as inputs into production,
or for consumption. Goods markets are perfectly competitive, but international trade is subject
to trade costs. Labor markets feature two sources of frictions: 1) switching costs to moving across
sectors à la Artuç et al. (2010), and 2) matching frictions within sectors à la Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). In particular, our framework allows for job creation and destruction to respond
to trade shocks, leading to rich unemployment dynamics and speaking to a key concern of the
public’s anxiety over globalization.7
We estimate our model using a simulated method of moments and data from the World Input-
Output Database and the United States Current Population Survey. To ensure tractability of the
estimation procedure, we assume the economy is in steady state and we match data moments in
Year 2000. The procedure conditions on the observed trade shares and allows us to estimate our
parameters country by country, greatly simplifying the process.
To understand the main mechanisms in our model, we first compare its response to different
sets of shocks to the response of the same model under balanced trade—an assumption that most
of the trade literature makes.8 We find that modeling imbalances can lead to significantly larger
5See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) for a survey of this approach to imbalances in international macroeconomics.
6More recent work on global imbalances builds on the standard consumption savings model by adding financial
frictions (e.g., Caballero et al. (2008) and Mendoza et al. (2009)), or demographics (e.g., Barany et al. (2018)).
7Pavcnik (2017) reviews survey data showing that only 20 percent of Americans believe trade creates jobs, while
50 percent believe it destroys them.
8Specifically, under balanced trade, we impose the condition that aggregate expenditure equals aggregate revenues
for each country in every time period.
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unemployment and reallocation responses to globalization shocks. To be specific, consider a hypo-
thetical positive temporary shock to Chinese productivity. In this case, consumption smoothing
leads to opposing patterns of reallocation in both the short and long run. In the short run, China
saves by lending to the rest of the world and running a trade surplus. To do so, China expands its
tradable sectors while other countries contract theirs, instead expanding in nontradables. In the
long run, other countries pay off their debt to China, permanently expanding their tradable sectors
above their initial steady-state levels. In contrast, in a balanced-trade world, short-run reallocation
is only dictated by changes in comparative advantage, while a temporary shock has no long-run
effects. Because it takes time for workers to find jobs, and it takes time for firms to find workers, a
magnification of reallocation induces a larger response in unemployment. Importantly, we find no
systematic relationship between the response of unemployment and the sign of trade imbalances.
When balanced trade is imposed, long-run allocations depend only on the final level of the
shocks. On the other hand, we find that the full path of shocks matters for long-run allocations when
trade imbalances are modeled. This dependence on the full path of shocks motivates us to conduct
an empirical analysis in which we extract the various technology, trade-cost, and intertemporal-
preference shocks that the global economy faced between 2000 and 2014. We use the extracted
shocks to answer three counterfactual questions. First, we show that the differences in predictions
between our model relative to a world of balanced trade are quantitatively important in response
to our extracted shocks.
In our second counterfactual exercise, we study the implications of trade imbalances and labor
market frictions for the gains from trade, typically computed using the sufficient-statistics approach
of Arkolakis et al. (2012) and extended by Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2014). Differences in
the predicted consumption effects of trade are significant, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
We show that imbalances and labor market frictions both play important roles in explaining the
discrepancies. Relatedly, we compute the globalization gains accrued to each country between 2000
and 2014 and compare them to those obtained in a world without the global savings glut, or in a
world with balanced trade. We show that the United States enjoys a 2.2 percent gain in response
to globalization shocks accrued to the world between 2000 and 2014. These gains would have been
73 percent larger in the absence of the global savings glut, but would have been 40 percent smaller
if we had lived in a balanced-trade world.
Finally, for our third counterfactual question, we use our model to revisit the “China shock,”
which consists of three factors: 1) the rapid increase in Chinese manufacturing productivity since
2000, 2) changes in trade costs over the same time period, and 3) China’s large national savings
rate (the “savings glut”).9 Aligned with previous findings, we corroborate that China contributed
to the decline of the U.S. manufacturing sectors between 2000 and 2014. However, this decline in
9See Autor et al. (2016) and references therein for more discussion of the China shock.
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manufacturing was quickly accompanied by job creation in the Services and Agriculture sectors,
leading to small unemployment effects. We find that shocks to the Chinese economy had a modest
effect on the U.S. trade deficit, highlighting that the evolution of the U.S. trade deficit is a result of
the full constellation of shocks hitting the global economy. On the other hand, if we feed the model
with all empirically extracted shocks but neutralize the Chinese savings glut (China’s intertemporal
preference shocks), the trade deficit in the U.S. would have shrunk in the short run but would have
been amplified in the long run. This amplification results in an even larger long-run contraction in
manufacturing.
Our paper speaks to a large literature that investigates the labor market consequences of glob-
alization, both empirically and quantitatively. We make two contributions to this literature by
incorporating both involuntary unemployment and trade imbalances into the state-of-the-art Ri-
cardian trade model of Caliendo and Parro (2015). Broadly speaking, quantitative trade models
based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) have only allowed for a nonemployment option (i.e., voluntary
unemployment) or have focused on steady-state analyses, ignoring transitional dynamics. Caliendo
et al. (2019) is an important example of a dynamic quantitative trade model in which workers
make a labor supply decision and face mobility frictions across sectors and regions. However, their
model does not feature job losses and unemployment. On the other end, Carrère et al. (2020) and
Guner et al. (2020) incorporate search frictions and unemployment into multisector extensions of
Eaton and Kortum (2002) but do not study out-of-steady-state dynamics. In a recent exception,
Rodriguez-Clare et al. (2020) incorporates wage rigidity into the model of Caliendo et al. (2019)
to investigate the unemployment effects of the China Shock on local labor markets in the United
States.10
Importantly, though, none of these papers model trade imbalances. We do so by incorporating
the workhorse model of imbalances used in the international macroeconomics literature allowing
for savings decisions by means of an international bonds market, as in Reyes-Heroles (2016).11
In that regard, our paper is closely related to Kehoe et al. (2018), who explore the implications
of the increase in the U.S. trade deficit for the secular decline in manufacturing labor over the
past four decades. However, this paper does not incorporate sluggish labor market adjustment or
10In addition to these papers based on the Eaton and Kortum model, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) add labor market
frictions to a two-country Melitz model, and Heid and Larch (2016) add labor market frictions to an Armington model
of trade. Coşar et al. (2016) incorporate search frictions and unemployment to an estimable small open-economy
Melitz model with firm dynamics, but they focus on steady-state analyses. Ruggieri (2019) extends that model to
study the transition in response to trade shocks. Similarly, Helpman and Itskhoki (2015) also analyze the dynamic
behavior of a two-country Melitz model with labor market frictions. Finally, Kambourov (2009), Artuç et al. (2010),
Dix-Carneiro (2014), and Traiberman (2019) also study transitional dynamics, but from the lens of small open-
economy models.
11A few papers have analyzed the consequences of current account rebalancing on labor reallocation and unem-
ployment by considering changes in imbalances as exogenous, e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Dekle et al. (2007),
and Eaton et al. (2013).
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unemployment dynamics.12
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our model. Section 3 describes
the data we use and our estimation procedure. In Section 4, we present our estimates and model fit
analysis, but we also interpret the key mechanisms of the model by simulating a series of impulse
response functions. Section 5 conducts a series of empirical applications of our model. We conclude
and discuss future research in Section 6.
2 Model
Our model builds on existing workhorse models of globalization, trade imbalances, and labor market
adjustment. Trade imbalances are modeled according to the intertemporal approach of Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995), and the trade bloc is based on Caliendo and Parro (2015). We adopt the
framework in Artuç et al. (2010) to model labor mobility frictions across sectors and the structure
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) to model search frictions and job creation and destruction.
Sections 2.1 through 2.9 formalize our model, showing how these different frameworks fit together.
2.1 Environment
There is no aggregate uncertainty, so that all agents have perfect foresight of aggregate variables.
There are i = 1, ..., N countries. Each country i has a constant labor force given by Li work-
ers/consumers. There are k = 1, ...,K sectors. Each sector k is characterized by a continuum set
of varieties j ∈ [0, 1] that can be traded across countries. These varieties are then aggregated by
perfectly competitive domestic firms, in each country, into nontradable composite sector-specific











where Qtk,i (j) is the quantity employed of variety j in sector k and country i at time t, and σ =
1
1−ε
is the elasticity of substitution across varieties within sectors. These composite sector-specific goods
are used solely as intermediate inputs for the production of a final good or for the production of
varieties. The price of one unit of the composite good of sector k in country i is given by the price
index associated with (1), which we denote by P I,tk,i .
A nontradable final good is produced by perfectly competitive firms that aggregate sector-
12In International Macroeconomics, Kehoe and Ruhl (2009), Meza and Urrutia (2011), and Ju et al. (2014) are
examples of the scarce work that exists studying the interaction between the current account and labor market
reallocation.
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where µk,i > 0 and
K∑
k=1
µk,i = 1 ∀i. The price of one unit of the final good is given by the price
index associated with (2), which we denote by PF,ti .
2.2 Labor Markets
Workers and single-worker firms producing varieties engage in a costly search process. Firms post
vacancies, but not all of them are filled. Workers search for a job, but not all of them are successful,
leading to involuntary unemployment. Each variety j constitutes a different labor market. More
precisely, the unemployment rate utk,i (j) is variety-specific, as is the vacancy rate v
t
k,i (j). Both
variables are expressed as a fraction of the labor force Ltk,i (j), measured as the sum of workers
who are employed or unemployed and searching within sector k and variety j at time t. We impose
that mi
(




matches are formed (as a fraction of the labor force Ltk,i (j)), where the
matching function mi is increasing in both arguments, concave, and homogeneous of degree 1.
From now on, we drop the index j, but the reader should keep in mind that all labor market





The fact that mi has constant returns to scale allows us to write the probability that a vacancy
matches with a worker as qi(θ
t
k,i) for a decreasing function qi, and the probability that an unem-
ployed worker matches with a vacancy as θtk,iqi(θ
t
k,i). We assume that workers can costlessly move
across varieties j within a sector, but that they face mobility costs across sectors, as we describe
in the next section.
2.3 Households
Countries are organized into representative families, each with a household head that, taking prices
as given, determines consumption, savings, and the allocation of workers across sectors to maximize
aggregate utility. We first describe the utility of individual workers, then we show how household
heads aggregate members’ utilities. For ease of notation, we temporarily omit the country subscript
i and let ` index individuals.
If a worker ended period t− 1 unemployed in sector k, she can either search in sector k at time
7
t (at no additional cost) or incur a moving cost Ckk′ and search in sector k
′ at time t—so that
Ckk = 0. If a worker ` is not employed at the production stage at t, she receives preference shocks{
ωtk,`, k = 1, ...,K
}
for each sector at time t. After unemployed workers receive these shocks, the
household head decides whether to keep each worker in the same sector and restrict him to search
there at t, or to incur a mobility cost and allow him to search in another sector. The ωtk,` shocks





, where γEM is the Euler-Mascheroni constant and ζ its shape parameter.
This structure follows closely Artuç et al. (2010).
After being allocated to search in sector k′ at t, the unemployed worker receives unemployment




k′). We follow Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) and assume that once a worker and a firm match at t, a match-specific productivity for
t + 1 production, xt+1` , is randomly drawn from a distribution Gk,i with [0,∞) support. This
productivity is constant over time from then on. At this point, the household head or the firm
can break a match if keeping it active is not optimal. Finally, at the end of every period, and
following the matching process, there is an exogenous probability χk of existing matches to dissolve
(excluding new ones). Successful matches that occur at time t only start to produce at t+ 1, and




. Finally, if a worker
produces in sector k, she receives a nonpecuniary benefit of ηk. Figure 1 details the timing of the
model. Section 2.5 describes the bargaining process that occurs at ta, and section 2.4.2 describes
the decision of firms to post vacancies at time tc.
Figure 1: Timing of the Model
t− 1 ta
Firms and workers
bargain over wages tb
Matched Workers: Produce
Unemployed: learn shocks ω,
choose sector where to search
tc
Workers: consume
Firms: post vacancies td
New matches




destruction w/ prob. χk
t+ 1



























where kt` is the sector where individual ` starts period t (that sector was determined at t − 1),
kt+1` is the t + 1 sector of choice (which is decided at time t, interim period tb in Figure 1),









idiosyncratic utility shocks received by unemployed workers at interim period tb, and c
t
` is individual
consumption. If individual ` is unemployed in sector k at t (et` = 0, k
t
` = k), the individual can
switch sectors (from k to kt+1` ), so that mobility costs Ckt`,k
t+1
`





are incurred (during period t). On the other hand, if individual ` is employed during
the production stage at t, et` = 1, the worker enjoys the nonpecuniary benefit of working in sector
kt` given by ηkt`





From the perspective of the household head, the allocation of workers follows a controlled
stochastic process: while the head can choose workers’ sectors given knowledge of switching costs





indicate whether the household head continues on with a match at time t given a match productivity
of xt+1` in sector k. Then, the probability that worker ` is employed in sector k at time t + 1,






, is given by
Pr
(








































et` = 1, then worker ` is employed in sector k at time t, and the match





If et` = 0—that is, the worker is unemployed at t—and the planner chooses k
t+1
` = k, then the









workers’ sector and employment status at t+ 1, kt+1` and e
t+1
` , are determined by actions taken at
t.
The head of the household aggregates (4) over family members and maximizes the net present
value of utility subject to her budget constraints and the controlled process on employment (5). In
addition to consumption and employment decisions, the household head has access to international
financial markets by means of buying and selling one-period riskless bonds which are available in
zero net supply around the world. One can think of international bond markets in period t as spot
markets in which a family buys a piece of paper with face value of Bt+1 in exchange for a bundle of
goods with the same value, and the piece of paper represents a promise to receive goods in period
t + 1 with a value equal to Rt+1Bt+1. International bond markets operate without frictions so
that the nominal returns Rt+1 are equalized across countries. Finally, the household collects and
aggregates profits across all firms, Πt, but takes this lump-sum payment as given. The household
head chooses the path of consumption, ct`, the path of sectoral choices, k
t
`, continuation decisions,



































d` ≤ 0. (7)
E0 denotes expectations with respect to future idiosyncratic shocks ω. The model has no aggregate
uncertainty, so that households and firms have perfect foresight of aggregate variables. δ is the
discount factor, common across all countries, and φt is an intertemporal preference shifter that the
household head experiences in period t.13 These shifters can differ across countries. The budget
constraint states the family can buy consumption goods or bonds for next period using profits
and wage income, net of interest payments (or collections) on past bonds. Let λ̃t be the Lagrange





= λ̃tPF,t, so individual consumption is equalized across individuals within the household:
ct` = c
t ∀`. Henceforth, we will refer to ct as per capita consumption. Armed with this observation,
Online Appendix A shows that the labor supply decisions solving (6) subject to (7) and (5) can be
decentralized and written recursively for unemployed and employed workers. We now turn to this
recursive formulation.
Let us return to indexing countries by i. Since workers are symmetric up to x and η in each
country, we stop indexing individual workers. We denote by Ũ tk,i(ω
t) the value of unemployment
in sector k, country i at time t conditional on shocks ωt, and by W tk,i (x) the value of employment
conditional on match-specific productivity x. If we define φ̂t+1i ≡
φt+1i
φti
, the sector decision policy



































k,i (x) + ηk,i + δφ̂
t+1
i (1− χk,i) max
{












is the expected value of Ũ tk,i(ω
t), integrated over ωt. The
13As will become clear later, intertemporal preference shocks are going to be important for our model to match
the time-series behavior of final expenditures across countries in the data. The use of these shifters is common in
the international macroeconomics literature. See Stockman and Tesar (1995) or Bai and Ŕıos-Rull (2015). However,
as discussed in the introduction, the fact that these shifters lead to wedges in Euler equations implies that they can
also be viewed as generated by frictions underlying asset markets that directly affect households’ aggregate saving
decisions.
14In an abuse of terminology, we will continue to refer to λ̃t as the Lagrange multiplier. However, the correct
shadow price associated with the period’s t budget constraint is given by δtφtλ̃t.
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first line in this equation corresponds to the costs of switching sectors, −Ckk′,i + ωtk′,i, as well as
the sector-specific value of being unemployed in that sector bk′i. The second line is the probability




multiplied by the discounted value of the match. Note that for
low values of W t+1k′,i (x), the household head dissolves the match so that the worker obtains U
t+1
k′,i .
Finally, the third line is the discounted value of being unemployed next period if the worker fails
to successfully match.
In Equation (9), wtk,i (x) is the wage paid by a firm with match productivity x. Note that it is
multiplied by the household head’s Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint λ̃ti. To decentralize
the household’s problem, individual workers must take into account the effect of their labor supply
decisions on the whole family’s utility. The second term is the nonpecuniary benefit of working in
sector k in country i. The next terms are the continuation values: with probability (1− χk,i), the
match does not exogenously dissolve and the worker continues the match; with probability χk,i,
the match exogenously breaks and the worker receives the value of unemployment in k. Since ω
is Gumbel distributed, the policy rule for unemployed workers can be solved analytically, so that
transition rates between t and t+ 1 can be written as:
st,t+1kk′,i =
exp












Firms produce by combining the labor of one single worker with composite intermediate inputs
purchased from all sectors. All firms producing variety j in sector k and country i have access to
common productivity ztk,i(j) and are paid p
t
k,i (j) for each unit of production. A firm producing













































where Stk,i (j, x) denotes the revenue (net of intermediate input payments) generated by the match
between a firm and a worker with productivity x producing variety j. One can show that
































and country i. We assume that following entry, switching across varieties within the sector is










′) ∀j, j′. Therefore, w̃tk,i and ptk,iztk,i do not depend on the specific variety.
This implies symmetry across varieties, allowing us to drop the index j identifying individual





surpluses”. As will become clearer in Section 2.7, these sectoral surpluses will play the same role
as wages do in Caliendo and Parro (2015).
We can write the value function for incumbent firms, J tk,i (x), as






+ (1− χk,i) δφ̂t+1i max
{
J t+1k,i (x) , 0
}
. (16)
The first term is the firm’s current profit, and the second is the firm’s continuation value of the
match.16 If J tk,i (x) < 0, the firm does not produce and exits.
15Remember that we assume that workers face no mobility frictions across varieties within sectors.
16Firm profits are multiplied by the multiplier on the family’s budget constraint in order to keep the units, utils,
consistent between the firm’s and worker’s problem. However, if one divides Jtk,i(x) by λ̃
t
i, then from the Euler
equation we derive below, it is clear that this formulation is equivalent to a risk-neutral firm discounting profits using
the nominal interest rate Rt+1.
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2.4.2 New Entrants
Potential entrants can match with a worker by posting vacancies in k (and variety j). We assume
that posting a vacancy costs κk,i units of the final good, and so amounts to total cost κk,iP
F,t
i .
Vacancies are posted at the interim period tc as illustrated in Figure 1. As argued above, J
t
k,i(x) is
not variety specific, which means the variety distinction can also be ignored for new entrants. If a
firm successfully matches with a worker at t, production starts at t+ 1. If we denote the expected
value of an open vacancy by V tk,i, then














V t+1k,i , 0
}  . (17)
The first term on the right-hand side is the cost of posting vacancies, which is converted to utility





and obtain the expected value of max
{
J t+1k,i , 0
}
starting in the next period. If they do not
match, they can post another vacancy. To close the model, we impose free entry so that V tk,i ≤ 0
∀k, i, t.17
2.5 Wages
The surplus of a match between a worker and a firm is defined as the utility generated by the
match in excess of the parties’ outside options. Imposing the free entry condition (V tk,i = 0), the
outside option to the firm is 0, while to the worker it is U tk,i. Hence, the surplus of the match
is given by Stk,i (x) ≡ J tk,i (x) + W tk,i (x) − U tk,i. We assume that firms and workers engage in
Nash bargaining over the surplus, with the workers’ bargaining weight given by βk,i. This leads to
J tk,i (x) = βk,iStk,i (x), which combined with Equations (9) and (16) implies that Stk,i, W tk,i, and J tk,i
















− U tk,i = 0. (18)
The wage equation resulting from Nash bargaining is












for x ≥ xtk,i. This is similar to the standard wage equation in search models: the worker’s wage is
a weighted average of the surplus, and a function of their outside option. The only new term is the
17In the equilibria we consider in this paper, we verify that this condition holds with equality, both in steady state
and along transition paths.
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nonpecuniary benefit, which is subtracted from the outside option. By integrating wages across all
individuals in the economy, one can solve for the family’s total wage income.
2.6 Labor Market Dynamics
Since workers can switch sectors between periods ta and tc, the sector-specific unemployment rates
actually differ at these two points in time within the same period. To this end, we first define
the beginning of period sector-specific unemployment rate as ũt−1k,i , and labor force as L
t−1
k,i . After
workers switch sectors (measured before matching at td), we define u
t
k,i to be the share of sector-k











where st,t+1`k,i denotes the transition rate from unemployment in sector ` to search in sector k between
t and t+ 1—see Equation (10). Ltk,i is the number of workers in sector k at t (more precisely at tc)





















where the second term on the right-hand side is the flow of workers into sector k and the third
term is the flow of workers out of sector k.

















and the number of jobs destroyed is given by
JDtk,i ≡
(
χk,i + (1− χk,i) Pr
(























Lt−1k,i (1− ũt−1k,i ) , (23)
where Pr
(






is the share of active firms above the productivity threshold
at t but below at t + 1 (endogenous exit). Consequently, the rate of unemployment at the end of








Equations (20)-(24) describe the evolution of labor market stocks over time. In any given period,
these stocks are bound by the labor market clearing condition:
K∑
k=1
Ltk,i = Li. (25)
2.7 International Trade
Our model of international trade closely follows Caliendo and Parro (2015). Varieties are traded
across countries. Under the assumptions of perfect competition and iceberg trade costs, the cost of
variety j from sector k produced in o can be purchased in country i at a price ptk,o (j) d
t
k,oi, where
the first term is the price of variety j in country o, and the second term is the iceberg trade cost of














Recall that because of the no-arbitrage condition we impose across varieties, ctk,i is equalized within
sectors, so price variation across varieties is dictated by ztk,i(j).
We assume that in any country i, sector k, and period t, the productivity component ztk,i(j)
is independently drawn from a Frechet distribution with scale parameter Atk,i—which is country,
sector, and time specific—and shape parameter, λ, which is time invariant.18 Consumers buy
the lowest-cost variety across countries, treating the same variety from different origins as perfect
substitutes. Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the resulting price index for the
composite sector-specific intermediate good (1) is given by

































λ , then consumers in country i spend a share π
t
k,oi of

















k,oi is the total expenditure of country i on sector k varieties and E
t
k,oi is the
total expenditure of country i on sector k varieties produced by country o. Market clearing requires
that total revenue Y tk,o coming from the production of varieties in sector k and country o must be














i as total expenditure
on final goods, and let EV,tk,i be the total expenditure of sector k in country i on vacancy posting









(1− γ`,i) ν`k,iY t`,i. (32)
The right-hand side represents total expenditure on sector k goods used in final consumption, va-
cancy posting costs, and as intermediate inputs, respectively. In turn, let Iti denote total disposable
income in country i, which is given by the portion of revenue that is not devoted to intermediate










. Net exports are
then given by NXti ≡ Iti − E
C,t












(1− γ`,i) ν`k,iY t`,i. (33)
Finally, labor market clearing dictates that total revenues coming from the production of













)dGk,i (s) . (34)
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2.8 Trade Imbalances







i = 0. However, these are not necessarily consistent with the household’s optimal dynamic


































. If the model is initially in steady state,
it is easy to verify that R0 = 1δ .
Having described the dynamic problem of the household, we can now discuss long-term trade
imbalances in our model. To do so, consider beginning from an initial steady state. Suppose that
at time t = 1, the economy unexpectedly experiences a series of shocks that end in finite time, and
that a new steady state is reached at time T .19 In this case, we arrive at the following equation for




























. This second piece is key in
our model: if a country runs a series of trade deficits (surpluses) in the short run, even if they begin
with a zero bond position, they may run trade surpluses (deficits) in perpetuity.
2.9 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is a set of initial steady-state allocations {L0k,i, x0k,i, B0i , }, a fi-
nal steady-state allocation {L∞k,i, x∞k,i, B∞i , }, and sequences of policy functions for workers/firms
{stkk′,i, xtk,i, wtk,i(x)}, value functions for workers/firms {U tk,i,W tk,i, J tk,i}, labor market tightnesses








, allocations {Ltk,i, utk,i, ctk,i},
19In our model, because of labor market dynamics, the final steady state is only reached in the limit, but the
approximation that the final steady state is reached in finite time is exactly the one used in computation.





BTi → 0 ∀i.
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, sectoral surpluses {w̃tk,i}, and
price indices
{





1. Workers’ and firms’ value functions solve (8), (9), and (16).
2. The free entry condition holds in each country and sector: V tk,i = 0 ∀k, i, t.
3. The wage equation solves the Nash bargaining problem and is given by (19).
4. Allocations and unemployment rates evolve according to (20), (21), and (24).
5. Consumption and bonds decisions solve the household’s dynamic consumption-savings prob-
lem (6) subject to (5) and (7).
6. Price indices are given by Equations (28) and (29).
7. Goods markets clear: Equations (30)–(32) are met.








10. The initial and final steady-state equilibria satisfy Equations (A.15)–(A.36) in Online Ap-
pendix B.
3 Data and Estimation
Our main source of cross-country data is the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), which com-
piles data from individual national accounts combined with bilateral international trade data. These
data cover 56 sectors and 44 countries, including a Rest of the World aggregate, between 2000 and
2014. We divide the economy into six sectors and six countries. We consider a world comprising the
United States, China, Europe, Asia/Oceania, the Americas, and the Rest of the World aggregate
constructed by the WIOD. Each country’s economic activity consists of six sectors: Agriculture;
Low-, Mid- and High-Tech Manufacturing; and Low- and High-Tech Services. Tables I and II detail
these divisions. We solve our model at the quarterly frequency.
The WIOD dataset allows us to generate various moments that we use in our procedure (detailed
below) to estimate a subset of the parameters: (a) employment shares across sectors and countries,
(b) average wages across sectors and countries, (c) trade shares, (d) net exports. Other moments
used in the estimation procedure are obtained from ILOSTAT and the U.S. Current Population
Survey (CPS). From ILOSTAT, we extract country-specific unemployment rates. From the CPS,
18






6 Rest of the World (ROW)
Notes: Asia/Oceania = {Australia, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan}, Americas = {Brazil, Canada,
Mexico}, Rest of the World ={Indonesia, India,
Russia, Turkey, Rest of the World}
Table II: Sector Definitions
1 Agriculture/Mining Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Mining and quarrying
2 Low-Tech Manufacturing Wood products; Paper, printing and publishing;
Coke and refined petroleum; Basic and fabricated metals;
Other manufacturing
3 Mid-Tech Manufacturing Food, beverage and tobacco; Textiles;
Leather and footwear; Rubber and plastics; Nonmetallic
mineral products
4 High-Tech Manufacturing Chemical products; Machinery;
Electrical and optical equipment; Transport equipment
5 Low-Tech Services Utilities; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade;
Transportation; Accommodation and food service activities;
Activities of households as employers
6 High-Tech Services Publishing; Media; Telecommunications; Financial, real estate
and business services; Government, education, health
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we compute yearly transition rates between sectors in the United States, as well as the dispersion
of wages. Table III summarizes the statistics targeted in the estimation.
Table III: Summary of Statistics Used in the MSM Procedure
Statistic Source
Employment allocations across sectors and countries WIOD
Average wages across sectors and countries WIOD
Trade shares across country pairs and sectors WIOD
Net exports across countries WIOD
Unemployment rates across countries ILOSTAT
Coefficient of variation of log-wages in the United States CPS
Yearly transition rates between sectors and from and to
unemployment for the United States CPS
Table IV summarizes the parameters we need to numerically solve the model. We split them
into three categories: 1) parameters that are fixed at values previously reported in the literature
because they are difficult to identify given the available data (Panel A); 2) parameters that can be
determined without having to solve the model (Panel B); and 3) parameters that are estimated by
the method of simulated moments, where we target the moments shown in Table III.21
As discussed in Artuç et al. (2010), we are not able to separately identify ζi—the dispersion
of ω shocks—and mobility costs Ck`,i without time variation in wages and transition rates across
sectors. For this reason, we follow Artuç et al. (2010) and impose ζi, to be equal to 1.63 and common
across countries.22 We then estimate mobility costs following the method of simulated moments
procedure we describe below. Given that we solve our model at the quarterly frequency, we impose
the discount factor to be δ = 0.9924, leading to an annual discount factor of 0.97—the same value as
in Artuç et al. (2010). Flinn (2006) discusses the difficulty in identifying the parameters of matching
functions without relying on data on vacancies. We parameterize the matching function according
to Coşar et al. (2016): qi (θ) =
(
1 + θξi
)1/ξi , and impose their estimate ξi = 1.84 to be common
across countries.23 Flinn (2006) also highlights the difficulty in estimating the bargaining-power
parameters without firm-level data. As a result, we follow standard practice in the search literature
and set βk,i = 0.5 (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). The Frechet scale parameter λ = 4 comes from
21To be precise, we do not target trade shares and net exports; we impose them in the estimation, so that they are
matched exactly.
22Estimates of ζi in the literature range from 0.7 in Denmark (Traiberman, 2019) to 2.1 in Brazil (Dix-Carneiro,
2014). The value of 1.63 in Artuç et al. (2010) is well within these bounds, making it a conservative choice. In
addition, Traiberman (2019) estimates ζi = 1.9 in Denmark when the method in Artuç et al. (2010) is applied, which
disregards worker heterogeneity and human capital accumulation.
23One convenient property of this functional form is that it always leads to qi (θ) and θqi (θ) being bounded by 0
and 1.
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Simonovska and Waugh (2014).24 Finally, we assume individuals have log utility over consumption,
u(c) = log(c). As described in Panel B, the WIOD dataset allows us to directly extract various
parameters of the model such as country-specific final expenditure shares µk,i, labor expenditure
shares γk,i, and input-output matrices νk`,i; this follows from the Cobb-Douglas assumptions we
imposed in the production functions and on how final consumption is aggregated.
Table IV: Summary of Parameters
Panel A. Fixed According to the Literature
Parameter Value Description Source
δ 0.9924 Discount factor Artuç et al. (2010)
ζi 1.63 Dispersion of ω shocks Artuç et al. (2010)
ξi 1.84 Matching function Coşar et al. (2016)
βk,i 0.5 Worker bargaining power Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
λ 4 Frechet scale parameter Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
Panel B. Estimated Outside of the Model
Parameter Description Source
µk,i Final expenditure shares WIOD
γk,i Labor expenditure shares WIOD
νk`,i Input-output matrix WIOD








Note: Artuç et al. (2010) use an annual discount factor of δ = 0.97. Since we work at the quarterly frequency,
we use δ = 0.97
1
4 . The distribution of match-specific productivities is imposed to follow a log-normal distribution
Gk,i ∼ logN (0, σ2k,i).
We estimate the parameters described in Panel C using the method of simulated moments. Let
Θ = (Θ1, ...,ΘN ) be the vector of these country-specific parameters. Our estimation procedure
assumes that the economy is in steady state in 2000 and conditions on the observed 2000 trade
shares πDatak,oi and net exports NX
Data
i —so these moments are perfectly matched. Online Appendix
B summarizes the equations that must be satisfied in a steady-state equilibrium. For a given
guess of Θ, we use our equilibrium equations, conditional on πDatak,oi and NX
Data
i , to generate:
(a) unemployment rates across countries; (b) employment allocations and average wages across
sectors and countries; (c) yearly transition rates between sectors and from and to unemployment
24Caliendo and Parro (2015) find a similar value for λ when it is imposed to be equal across sectors: 4.55.
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in the United States; and (d) cross-sectional wage dispersion in the United States. The estimation
procedure searches for a vector of parameters Θ that minimizes the distance between the model-
generated moments and those we measure in the data.
We impose a few restrictions on the parameters estimated by the simulated method of moments.
First, the identification of mobility costs Ck`,i relies on data on both wages and yearly intersectoral
transition rates. Although these data can be found in household surveys across a few of the countries
we consider, we opted to identify these parameters using transition rates for the United States
only. Therefore, we impose mobility costs to be common across countries. Also for identification
purposes, we need to impose Ckk = 0 for all k. Second, we impose the distribution of match-specific
productivities Gk,i to follow a log-normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ
2
k,i. We restrict
σ2k,i to be the same across sectors and countries, and we identify it by targeting the cross-sectional
coefficient of variation of log-wages in the CPS. Third, we impose that the exogenous exit rates χk,i
are decomposed into a country component χi and a sector component χk (that is, χk,i = χi + χk).
The sector-specific component χk is identified from U.S. transitions from sector-specific employment
to unemployment. The country-specific components are then adjusted to better match the country-
specific unemployment rates. Fourth, the utility of unemployment bk,i is imposed to be country
specific (that is bk,i = bi). This parameter will be important for the model to be able to match levels
of wages across countries. Fifth and finally, sector- and country-specific utility terms ηk,i help the
model simultaneously fit sector-specific wages and employment shares. To achieve identification,
we need to impose ηk0,i = 0 for some sector k0 (we picked k0 = Agriculture).
A convenient aspect of our approach is that, by conditioning on the observed 2000 trade shares




i Yk,i = 1, we can solve for
sector-country revenues {Yk,i} that are independent of Θ. Specifically, Equations (31), (33), and
the normalization lead to a system of equations in {Yk,i}, which can be solved before starting the
estimation procedure. Consequently, the sector- and country-specific labor demand side of the
model is fixed throughout the estimation procedure, allowing the labor supply side in each country
to be solved in isolation. To see this, notice that Equation (34) contains revenues on the left-hand
side, and the right-hand side only depends on country-specific sectoral variables and parameters.
Therefore, in steady state, observed trade flows and trade imbalances are sufficient statistics for
international linkages. This property allows us to estimate the model country by country, greatly
simplifying the estimation procedure.25 Indeed, if all parameters were country specific and we had
the same set of data for each country, estimation could be conducted in parallel for each country.
As a final point, a convenient aspect of conducting the estimation conditional on the observed trade
shares is that we do not have to estimate the technology parameters Ak,i and trade costs dk,oi. We
25The method of simulated-moments objective function is highly nonlinear and nonconvex, so that global optimiza-
tion routines, such as Simulated Annealing, must be applied. Breaking a large parameter vector into smaller subsets
of parameters that can be separately estimated greatly simplifies the estimation procedure.
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develop algorithms to perform counterfactual responses to shocks to technology parameters and
trade costs, relying on the ”exact hat algebra” approach in Dekle et al. (2007), Dekle et al. (2008)
and Caliendo and Parro (2015).
Although the model could be flexibly estimated country by country if we had data on yearly
transitions across sectors for all countries, we impose Ck`,i and σ
2
k,i to be constant across countries
and identified off the United States’ CPS transition rates and wage dispersion data. Therefore,
we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the model for the United States, backing out Ck`, σ
2
k
and χk. In a second step, we estimate the rest of the parameters in parallel, country by country,
conditional on the values of Ck`, σk, and χk which are estimated in the first step.
At this point, it is worthwhile mentioning that our estimation approach, which does not estimate





in the 2000 steady-state equilibrium. Our counterfactual algorithms then allow κ̃k,i to
respond to shocks, using exact hat algebra. It is also important to clarify that identifying κ̃k,i is
difficult in practice. Even though the objective function is not flat with respect to κ̃k,i, it tends to
be relatively flat for a wide range of values. For that reason, we follow Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) and impose that the cost of posting one vacancy κk,iP
F
i equals 0.58×wk,i, where wk,i is the
average wage in sector k and in country i. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) base their calibration on
a combination of the labor and capital costs of posting vacancies in a single-sector search model.26
While their model and ours differ on several dimensions—e.g., we have multiple sectors and match
heterogeneity—there are two reasons we turn to their calculation. First, Hagedorn and Manovskii
combine micro and macro data from multiple sources, mapping their numbers to observable costs
of recruitment, capital purchasing, and other costs; second, their calibration of vacancy posting
costs does not rely on other parameters of the model, merely on observable data (e.g., the capital
share of income and the unemployment rate), so their estimate is not contaminated by the fact
that our other parameters are not always estimated to be the same as Hagedorn and Manovskii’s.





and 0.58 in our method of simulated-moments objective function. The full estimation algorithm is
described in Online Appendix C.1.
26As the authors point out, in the steady state of a single-sector search model, ”capital” is equivalent to interpreting
vacancies as capital and reinterpreting the productivity process. In this sense, a ”vacancy” is a metaphor for the
whole cost of hiring a worker—the flow cost of capital, HR efforts, etc. We adopt a similar view in our paper, without
modeling each piece.
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4 Estimation Results and Mechanisms
4.1 Estimates and Model Fit
The estimated parameters can be found in the Online Appendix C.7, in Tables A.1 through A.8.
We first discuss the parameters that are obtained outside of the model. The Online Data Appendix
details how these are computed with data from the WIOD. Table A.1 displays the final expenditure
shares µk,i. We can separate the countries in this table into two groups with similar expenditure
shares: 1) United States, Europe, Asia, and Americas; and 2) China and Rest of the World. The
biggest difference between these two groups of countries is that China and the Rest of the World
spend a much larger share of their disposable income on Agricultural goods and significantly lower
share on High-Tech Services.
Table A.2 displays the share of revenues devoted to labor payments. This share varies mostly
within countries and across sectors and ranges between 0.24 (in High-Tech Manufacturing in China)
and 0.68 (in High-Tech Services in Rest of the World). Finally, Table A.3 displays the average across
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countries of the input-output matrices. As is well known, the diagonal elements tend to be larger
than the off-diagonal elements.
Our mobility costs are displayed in Table A.4. Artuç et al. (2010) express their mobility cost
estimates as multiples of average wages. In contrast, in our model, workers compute their value
functions and make decisions based on λ̃i × w̃k,i, and not just based on sector-specific average
wages. Therefore, to make our estimates comparable to those in Artuç et al. (2010), we express
mobility costs as multiples of λ̃US ×wUS , where wUS is the average wage in the U.S. (in the data).
We obtain that our estimated mobility costs across sectors (as a fraction of λ̃US × wUS) range
from virtually zero to a maximum of 3.1. These numbers are of the same order of magnitude, but
lower than what Artuç et al. (2010) estimate. (In their preferred specification, mobility costs are
six times average wages.) We believe that two ingredients of our model absent from theirs, search
frictions and sector-specific utility terms ηk,i, account for our lower estimates of mobility costs.
Indeed, Artuç and McLaren (2015) extends ACM to allow for η terms and also find lower moving
frictions. Finally, Table A.7 shows that the values of unemployment bi tend to be negative across
all countries. As the search literature has shown, a negative value of unemployment is necessary
to generate the magnitudes of wage dispersion typically found in the data (e.g., Hornstein et al.,
2011; Meghir et al., 2015).
Figure 2 shows the model fit for the various moments we target: (a) employment shares across
sectors and countries; (b) unemployment rates across sectors and countries; (c) average wages across
sectors and countries; and (d) intersectoral transition rates in the United States. As a general rule,
the model matches the targeted moments well.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions
Endogenizing trade imbalances as optimal intertemporal consumption decisions implies that the
dynamics of the shocks hitting the economy are key for the evolution of imbalances. Hence, in
order to understand the rich mechanisms at play in our model, we study the model’s behavior in
response to three sets of shocks. First, we subject the model to a tenfold increase in Ak,China, the
productivity location parameter in China, uniform across sectors k and lasting for five years before
turning back to its original level. The magnitude of this shock is in line with the size of actual
changes in Chinese productivity that we recover in section 5.1. Next, we feed the model with a
tenfold permanent increase in Ak,China that happens once and for all at t = 1. Finally, we simulate
a slow-moving and linear increase in Ak,China that reaches a tenfold increase in 15 years and remains
at that level from there on. These shocks are illustrated in Figure 3. The economy is initially in
steady state, so the shocks are unanticipated at t = 0, but their paths are fully anticipated at t = 1.
To highlight the quantitative and qualitative importance of modeling trade imbalances, we study
the behavior of the complete model with bonds as well as the behavior of a model without bonds,
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where trade is balanced in every period—that is NXti = 0 ∀i, t.27
Figure 3: Shocks to Chinese Productivity Âk,China – Uniform Across Sectors
(a) Temporary (b) Once-And-For-All
(c) Slow Moving
We start with the temporary shock depicted in Figure 3a. The evolution of net exports in
Figure 4 aligns with what we would have expected from standard macroeconomic models with
intertemporal decisions. The temporary boost in productivity, and therefore income, induces China
to save in the short run by running a large trade surplus. As productivity reverts back to its initial
level, China sustains a permanent trade deficit of 21% of GDP, as it consumes the return on its
savings. On the other hand, the remaining countries borrow from China, running trade deficits
in the short run. As the productivity increase in China vanishes, all countries start to sustain
permanent trade surpluses, repaying their debts to China.
While these aggregate patterns are standard, this productivity shock has varied impacts on
the more disaggregated economy. Specifically, the rise in productivity induces substantial labor













27To make these two cases comparable, we study the complete model responses (with trade imbalances) imposing
that trade is balanced in the initial steady state. See Online Appendix C.3 for details on how we implement this
procedure using exact hat algebra techniques.
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Figure 4: Net Exports Over GDP in Response to Temporary Productivity Growth in China (Figure
3a)
which accumulates yearly changes in sectoral employment shares over time.
Figure 5a plots the evolution of the reallocation index (38) across countries. When we consider
our complete model with bonds, there is an immediate and steep rise in reallocation in all countries
following China’s productivity jump. After productivity returns to its initial level, reallocation
continues for several years before reaching its final steady-state level. Even though we consider a
uniform productivity shock across sectors, we observe substantial labor reallocation, both within
China and within other countries.28 The reason that uniform productivity changes can have large
impacts on labor reallocation is trade across countries, which adds asymmetries to how sectors
respond to the same productivity shock. Our model features two sources of asymmetries. First,
heterogeneity in trade costs implies that the tradability of goods differs across countries and sectors.
As explained by Dornbusch et al. (1977), transfers (here, net exports) across countries alter the
terms of trade and therefore the allocation of economic activity within each country. Second,
countries differ in their final consumption bundles, which implies that the global distribution of
final consumption expenditure matters for the allocation of workers across sectors. Relatedly,
heterogeneity in input-output linkages across countries also generate changes in countries’ terms of
trade and global expenditure patterns.
28Note that in a closed economy without mobility costs and search frictions, we would have seen no reallocation
effects, given homothetic preferences and our production structure, as relative prices would not change. However,
the presence of heterogeneous mobility costs across sectors could lead to some reallocation effects as the option value
of search would change differentially across sectors. However, based on Shimer (2005), we expect this effect to be
quantitatively small.
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Figure 5: Labor Market Dynamics in Response to Temporary Productivity Growth in China (3a)
(a) Reallocation Index (b) Unemployment
(c) Labor Allocations - Full Model (d) Labor Allocations - Balanced Trade
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The increase in reallocation is directly tied to an increase in unemployment in all countries,
as shown in Figure 5b. This highlights a key mechanism in our model: even positive labor de-
mand shocks can increase unemployment through asymmetric shifts in labor demand. Once again,
there are two reasons this can occur. First, contracting sectors will destroy low-productivity jobs,
dislocating workers who must switch sectors. Second, it takes time for workers who switch into
expanding sectors to find new jobs. Relatedly, there is no systematic relationship between the
response of unemployment and the sign of trade imbalances.
The reason why modeling imbalances generate more reallocation is due to the richer patterns
of reallocation that emerge, shown in Figures 5c (for the full model) and 5d (for balanced trade).
When we consider the complete model with bonds, rising imports in the U.S. following Chinese
productivity growth do not need to be immediately met with rising exports. Instead, the U.S.
imports goods in the short run and reallocates labor to service sectors, which are less tradable.
This pattern follows from homothetic preferences, and so demand for services increases when total
consumption in the U.S. rises—as this demand cannot be easily met with imports. However, if we
impose balanced trade in every period, exports from the U.S. must immediately rise to offset the
increase in imports. In doing so, labor reallocates to the sector in which it has highest comparative
advantage (high relative productivity coupled with lower trade costs), which is also the sector in
which China has higher relative demand: agriculture. Reallocation when trade is balanced is driven
by trade costs and comparative advantage, which do not change much in response to the temporary
productivity growth in China.
Turning to the long run, saving and borrowing behavior leads to permanent changes in final
steady-state bond positions across countries. These permanent shifts in the long-run allocation
of wealth carry implications for steady-state labor allocations and unemployment. The sources of
long-run reallocation are similar to those operating in the short run, except that the effects of the
temporary shock on the distribution of bond positions (and therefore wealth) across countries is
permanent. Specifically, the U.S. runs a large deficit in the short run, which must be paid off in
the form of long-run trade surpluses. To repay its debt with China, it shifts labor back to its goods
sectors, which can easily ship their production internationally. In the long run, the goods sectors
in the U.S. expand relative to the initial steady state, whereas the U.S. service sectors slightly
contract. These long-run effects in response to a temporary shock are in sharp contrast to those in
the model with balanced trade, which predicts that long-run allocations are unchanged relative to
initial ones.
We next turn to the analysis of the once-and-for-all shock in Chinese productivity depicted in
Figure 3b. Figure 6 highlights that the effect of this shock on net exports across countries is of much
smaller magnitude. Indeed, when an economy is subject to a permanent shock, the importance of
savings to smooth consumption is of secondary order. If labor were perfectly mobile across sectors,
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economies would instantaneously reallocate labor and achieve their unconstrained optimal levels of
expenditure. But because labor is not perfectly mobile, we do observe imbalances arising; however,
these are modest. It is therefore not surprising that, in the event of once-and-for-all permanent
shocks, the behavior of the model with imbalances is similar to one without imbalances.29
Figure 6: Net Exports Over GDP in Response to Once-and-for-all Productivity Growth in China
(Figure 3b)
Finally, we study the behavior of our model when we feed it with a slow increase in Chinese
productivity, as is illustrated in Figure 3c. Figure 7 shows that, in this case, China heavily borrows
in the short run in anticipation of its large increase in long-run productivity. All other countries
lend to China by running large surpluses for more than ten years. As with the temporary shock,
trade imbalances greatly magnify the extent to which reallocation and unemployment respond
relative to the trade balance benchmark. Figures 8a and 8b show that the short-run labor market
dynamics are very different across the two models. With trade imbalances, Figure 8c shows that
the U.S. reallocates resources away from its service sectors and toward its goods sectors so that
their output can be shipped to China. However, in the long run, China needs to repay its debt and
so ships goods back to the U.S. This leads to a long-run contraction of manufacturing in the U.S.
and an expansion of the remaining sectors. Compare this behavior with the monotonic decline in
manufacturing in the U.S. if trade is imposed to be balanced in Figure 8d. The magnitude of the
manufacturing contraction is also much more limited under trade balance.
The main conclusion of this section is that trade imbalances can significantly amplify the real-
29Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that this prediction of the model could be different for a shock that is not
uniform across sectors, or for permanent shocks to trade costs (Reyes-Heroles, 2016; Alessandria and Choi, 2019).
30
location and unemployment responses to temporary shocks. They can also lead to very different
patterns of intersectoral reallocation in the short and long run. However, the quantitative relevance
of endogenizing imbalances depends on the nature of the shock, as illustrated by our once-and-for-all
permanent shock example. This fact can be appreciated by comparing the results for the tempo-
rary and slow-moving shocks. An additional important result worth pointing out from our previous
analysis is that the magnitude of reallocation and unemployment responses is independent of the
sign of the trade imbalance. Finally, our simulations highlight that, with trade imbalances, the full
path of shocks matters for the behavior of imbalances over time, but also for the determination
of their long-run consequences. Given the importance of the path of shocks for trade imbalances
and the adjustment process, we now turn to the analysis of the labor market consequences of the
shocks the global economy actually experienced between 2000 and 2014.
Figure 7: Net Exports over GDP in Response to Slow Productivity Growth in China (Figure 3c)
5 Counterfactuals
Section 4.2 showed that the exact path of shocks shapes the magnitude and evolution of trade
imbalances over time, directly influencing long-run outcomes through changes in the long-run global
distribution of bond holdings. For this reason, we conduct an empirical exercise in which we extract
the various shocks the global economy has actually experienced between 2000 and 2014. Armed
with these shocks, we conduct a common exercise in the international trade literature: how do
labor markets behave over time in response to the constellation of globalization shocks (i.e., shocks
to productivity and trade costs)? In this exercise, we compare the labor market responses that we
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Figure 8: Labor Market Dynamics in Response to Slow Productivity Growth in China (Figure 3c)
(a) Reallocation Index (b) Unemployment
(c) Labor Allocations - Full Model (d) Labor Allocations - Balanced Trade
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obtain with our model of trade imbalances to the responses that we obtain by imposing balanced
trade. Having established the quantitative importance of trade imbalances for both the adjustment
process and long-run allocations, we compare the consumption gains in response to changes in trade
costs in our model to those obtained in standard models of trade, as summarized by the sufficient
statistic approach developed by Arkolakis et al. (2012). Next, we compute the globalization gains
accrued to each country between 2000 and 2014 and compare them to those obtained in a world
without the global savings glut, or in a world with balanced trade (i.e., no bonds). Finally, given the
recent interest in the ”China shock” on the U.S. labor market, we use our extracted shocks to study
the effects of shocks to the Chinese economy on the behavior of unemployment and manufacturing
employment in the U.S. We also investigate the contribution of the China shock to the U.S. trade
deficit and to the trade surplus in China.
5.1 Extracting Shocks from the Data
This section obtains the time series for three sets of shocks in the global economy between December
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between December of 2000 and December of 2014.
Armed with these data, we can exploit the gravity structure of the trade block of the model, as
in Head and Ries (2001) and Eaton et al. (2016), to recover the changes in bilateral trade costs









In turn, we rely on the Euler equation (35) and normalize φ̂tUS = 1 ∀t, as in Reyes-Heroles (2016),






for t = 1, ..., T − 1, (40)
where T is the last period for which we have data, which refers to December of 2014. Note that we






k,oi for all t > T , where T is the last period for which we have data (T = 14
and refers to December 2014). We also impose φ̂ti = 1 for all t > T + 1—as explained below, the value of φ̂
T+1
i = 1
is set to gauge the model-implied steady-state value for final consumption expenditures EC,∞i .
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still need to determine φ̂T+1i , but we will need to use the structure of the model to do so, as this
value will depend on the model-implied steady-state value for final good expenditures EC,∞i .








)λ (ĉtk,i)λ . (41)
Given that ĉtk,i depends on w̃
t
k,i, which has no data counterpart, we need to use the full structure
of the model to recover the sequence of productivity shocks. Online Appendix C.6 details the








using the full structure of the model.
To be able to recover the full set of shocks the economy experienced between 2000 and 2014, we












are imposed to be constant from 2015 onward.31
Figure 9a shows an increase in productivity all over the world. In particular, China has ex-
perienced large increases in productivity, especially in manufacturing sectors.32 Other emerging
economies—which make up the bulk of the Americas and the Rest of the World aggregate—also
experienced impressive productivity growth, while growth was more muted for advanced economies.
Turning to trade costs, we first construct a summary statistic to capture this large object. We










Figure 9b plots this index for each country and sector. In general, import trade costs are declining
for the United States and Asia and are approximately flat in Europe (with some heterogeneity
across sectors). Perhaps surprisingly, starting after the 2008 financial crisis and concurrent collapse
in trade, initially falling import trade costs in China begin to revert and are actually larger by the
end of the sample. This estimate of changes in trade costs reflects the fall in the share of trade
in output, as documented in Bems et al. (2013). The sources for these increasing frictions are
myriad, and they include policy changes in countries like China, as well as changes in supply chain
management, and other reasons. That said, our measures of frictions are a standard, straightforward
31We also assume the economy is in steady state in 2000 and fully anticipates the full set of current and future
shocks in 2001.




, this is not directly comparable to pro-
ductivity in the classic sense of a Solow residual. In order to make sense of the magnitudes, note that Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) growth, defined as ĉtk,i/P̂
I,t





1/λ. Therefore, using our recovered
values for Âtk,i, data on changes in trade shares, and imposing λ = 4, the magnitude for actual annualized TFP
growth in China ranges from 3 to 5% per year, depending on the sector—which is in line with growth-accounting
estimates discussed in Zhu (2012).
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measure of the implied barriers to trade.
Finally, we turn to our measure of shocks to intertemporal preferences, which are presented in
Figure 10. The shocks in the U.S. are normalized to 1 in every period. In Europe and Asia (except
China), the discount factor shocks fluctuate around 1, suggesting little persistent deviations in
consumption behavior from what would be expected with a simple consumption smoothing model.
On the other hand, China, the Americas, and the aggregated remaining countries (Rest of the
World) exhibit persistent shocks to their intertemporal preferences, suggesting increased patience
over the period we consider. These persistent deviations are often referred to as the ”global savings
glut.”33 It is important to recognize that there are rich dynamics to consumption in the real world,
reflecting preferences, frictions, and other factors. We are agnostic on the exact theory, instead
summarizing the effect of these channels with the φ̂ti shocks. This is useful because it allows us
to ask counterfactual questions about the dynamics of globalization shocks in the absence of the
global savings glut, without having to specify what policy or change in deep parameters would be
used to achieve this—a useful benchmark to compare against the usual assumption in trade of no
consumption smoothing whatsoever.
To extract the shocks the global economy experienced between 2000 and 2014, we have solely
relied on data on trade shares, sectoral prices, and aggregate final expenditures across countries. We
have not used information on labor allocations or trade imbalances. It is therefore natural to ask how
the model-implied behavior of labor allocations and trade imbalances compare to those in the data.
A note of caution before we proceed with this comparison: given our perfect foresight assumption,
once we feed the shocks into the model, responses at impact are large, as agents (suddenly) fully
anticipate the path of future shocks. That said, Figure 11 compares labor allocations in the United
States in our model (Panel A) to labor allocations in the data (Panel B). Our model replicates
the decline of manufacturing as a whole, the expansion of services, and the decline and rebound
of agriculture. The magnitudes in our model are compressed, but we believe this is explained by
preexisting trends driving the decline of manufacturing as well as the fact that we impose that the
intertemporal shocks φ̂ti revert to 1 after 2014. The latter observation is important, as individuals
in the model anticipate the end of the savings glut years before the end of our sample period,
leading to some rebalancing happening before 2014. This observation is also important to explain
the strong rebound of Low-Tech Manufacturing, for which we do not find support in the data. To
verify the plausibility of this explanation, we simulated the same shocks we extracted, but with
one difference: we keep the φ̂ti shocks fixed at their 2012-to-2014 averages for 15 more years (that
is, until 2029). Indeed, not only the magnitude of the downsize of manufacturing that we obtain is
33The large trade surplus that China has been running since the early 2000s is a puzzle for models in which the
main driving forces are productivity shocks. For instance, as argued by Song et al. (2011), financial frictions within
China are key drivers of the Chinese savings glut. Our intertemporal preference shocks constitute a reduced-form way
to allow the model to match the time-series behavior of Chinese aggregate expenditures and the rest of the world.
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Figure 9: Extracted Globalization Shocks
(a) Productivity Shocks Âtk,i
(b) Trade-Weighted Import Costs d
t
k,i (See Equation (42))
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Figure 10: Extracted Intertemporal Preference Shocks φ̂ti
larger than what is depicted in Figure 11a, but also Low-Tech steadily contracts until 2014.
Figure 11: Comparing Labor Allocations in the Model and Data
(a) Model (b) Data
Figure 12 compares the model-implied trade imbalances in the U.S. and China to those in the
data. The model is able to capture the large surplus in China as well as the persistent deficit
in the U.S. However, the model misses the behavior of Chinese imbalances in the beginning of
the period. This happens as China anticipates its massive shocks that are coming (both large
increases in productivity and shocks to intertemporal preferences). This anticipation leads to large
unemployment in the short run. In turn, this implies an initial production shortage and trade
deficits.
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Figure 12: Comparing Net Exports in the Model and Data
(a) Model (b) Data
5.2 Global Technology and Trade Shocks
Our first counterfactual exercise focuses on the general equilibrium effects of changes in productivity
and trade costs since 2000, with no shocks to intertemporal preferences. In particular, we focus








above. Our goal is to isolate the
quantitative significance of globalization on labor market outcomes in a setting where workers
smooth their consumption over time. As we will show, the shocks we recover from the data
have significant impacts on global imbalances, which has implications for adjustment dynamics,
unemployment, wages, and, ultimately, consumption.
Before discussing results, it is helpful to contrast our approach with standard practice. There
are two typical approaches to dealing with imbalances in the quantitative trade literature. The
first approach involves fixing imbalances in the data, or assuming balanced trade period by period.
This method has been employed in both static models (e.g., Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Dekle
et al. (2007)) and dynamic models (e.g., Dix-Carneiro (2014) and Traiberman (2019)). The use
of this method in dynamic models is a particularly strong assumption, since it implicitly imposes
that workers and governments have no access to borrowing or savings mechanisms. The second
approach involves assigning ownership shares of capital or fixed factors to agents at an initial
point and fixing these shares over time and in counterfactuals. Although this procedure does not
follow from optimizing behavior, this method has been used in Caliendo et al. (2019), allowing for
imbalances to change as returns to fixed factors change. If returns to capital increase while those to
labor decline, this implies that workers have access to some social insurance. Nevertheless, agents
are prevented from buying or selling shares in response to the shocks they face.34
34These approximations may be reasonable in a situation where imbalances are small along the transition path from
one equilibrium to the next. This would be the case, for example, if the primary force for changes in imbalances were
shocks to aggregate consumption, and orthogonal to trade shocks (i.e., if imbalances were driven by φ̂ti). Nevertheless,
these are imperfect if the path and magnitude of trade shocks lead to large changes in consumption and savings,
which we show is the case below.
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To be able to compare the implications of the globalization shocks in our model of trade imbal-
ances relative to a model without imbalances, we start both models from a steady state with trade
balance—that is, NXti = 0 ∀i at t = 0—see Online Appendix C.3 for details on our procedure,
which is based on exact hat algebra. Figure 13 shows that the globalization shocks we feed into
the model can lead to substantial imbalances in the short run. These predictions range from a
trade deficit in China of up to 65% of GDP to a trade surplus in Asia of close to 20%. The U.S.
runs a short-run surplus amounting to close to 10% of GDP. As expected from previous literature,
if we purge the model of the intertemporal preference shocks, we see China running a large trade
deficit in the short run. This is not surprising in light of our discussion in section 4.2, as Chinese
productivity strongly and steadily increases between 2000 and 2014, more than in other countries.
Figure 13: Net Exports over GDP in Response to Global Technology and Trade Shocks
We learned in our analysis of section 4.2 that trade imbalances can amplify the amount of
reallocation in the economy relative to a model where trade is balanced. Our empirical exercise
corroborates this finding, as we illustrate in Figure 14a. The behavior of unemployment is also quite
different, and is driven by a larger amount of reallocation. Figures 13 and 14b also show that the
responses of unemployment are not systematically related to the sign of imbalances. Importantly,
Figures 14c and 14d highlight the importance of modeling trade imbalances in understanding the
adjustment process in response to globalization shocks. A model that imposes trade balance often
predicts opposing patterns of short-run reallocation. For example, our model with imbalances
predicts that the globalization shocks would lead to an expansion of all manufacturing sectors in
the U.S. in the short run but a contraction in the long run. On the other hand, trade balance would
lead to a monotonic decline of High-Tech Manufacturing and a long-run expansion of Low-Tech
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Manufacturing. Other countries also display drastically different patterns of adjustment in both
the short and long runs.
5.3 Trade Costs and Imbalances
The previous section established that empirically extracted shocks can lead to significant trade
imbalances, and that accounting for these imbalances can substantially alter the adjustment process
relative to a balanced-trade world. This section studies the implications of both trade imbalances
and labor market frictions for the consumption gains from trade, and for how these gains compare
with the widely used sufficient-statistics approach based on Arkolakis et al. (2012), henceforth
ACR. Our model nests the Ricardian model considered in ACR, but violates two of that model’s
key assumptions: 1) no labor market frictions; and 2) no trade imbalances.
Concretely, we consider the changes in trade costs between 2000 and 2014 that we obtain in
Section 5.1, purging the model of shocks to intertemporal preferences and to productivity. In this
case, the implied gains from trade following Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2014), who extend the









where all of the changes are between final and initial steady states and ℵjk,i is the j, kth element
of the Leontief inverse of the input-output matrix in country i. We obtain π̂k,ii, solving our full
model. To perform the comparison between consumption gains in our model and those using the
ACR formula, we first focus on the change in steady-state consumption given by our framework.
Given the static nature of the ACR model, we believe this is a more direct comparison between our
predictions for the gains from trade.
Figure 15a displays the comparison between the long-run ACR gains in consumption (blue bars)
and the long-run gains we obtain in our model (red bars). Overall, these gains are quite different.
The ACR formula predicts that the U.S. endures a 0.6% loss in response to the changes in trade
costs the global economy experiences, whereas our model predicts that the U.S. experiences a gain
of 0.9%. Our conclusions differ starkly in China, where the ACR formula predicts a gain of almost
3% but our model predicts a long-run loss of 0.7%. These numbers differ because of both labor
market frictions and long-run trade imbalances that arise in our model. The latter figures depend
on the full path of shocks fed into the model, and not just the initial and final levels of trade costs
as do the ACR gains. Figure 16 shows the long-run trade imbalances that arise in our model. They
are particularly important in China, Asia, and the Rest of the World.
Given the dynamic nature of our model, we define the dynamic consumption gains from trade
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Figure 14: Labor Market Dynamics in Response to Global Technology and Trade Shocks
(a) Reallocation Index (b) Unemployment
(c) Labor Allocations - Full Model (d) Labor Allocations - Balanced Trade
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as the ratio between the level of constant consumption that would yield the same net present-












Similarly, we can also calculate ”ACR Dynamic” gains from trade, by taking the net present value
of the static gains calculated by (43) in every period. More precisely,











where π̂tk,ii is the change in trade shares between periods 0 and t, computed using our full model.
Figure 15: Shocks in Trade Costs and the Consumption Gains from Trade
(a) Long-Run Gains from Trade (b) Dynamic Gains from Trade
Notes: In Panel (a), the blue bars, “ACR,” refer to the consumption gains computed using equation (43); the red bars, “Full
Model,” refer to the change in steady-state consumption given by our full model with trade imbalances. In Panel (b), the blue
bars, “ACR,” refer to the present value of gains calculated by using equation (45); the red bars, “Full Model,” refer to the
present value of gains over the transition in the full model with trade imbalances, using equation (44). In all cases, π̂tk,ii is
obtained by simulating our full model initialized with NXti = 0∀i at t = 0
Figure 15b compares the consumption gains predicted by the “dynamic ACR” formula (45)
to the dynamic gains computed according our model (44). Although predictions are now similar
for China and Europe, they are quite different for the remaining countries. For example, Asia
enjoys a consumption gain of almost 2.5% according to the dynamic ACR formula, whereas our
model predicts an essentially zero gain. Also noteworthy, the Rest of the World gains by almost
2% according to our model, but by less than 0.5% according to the dynamic ACR formula. In
a series of exercises available upon request, we investigate the separate role of trade imbalances
and labor market frictions behind the discrepancies between the predictions of the ACR formula
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and those of our model. To that end, we simulate our model under balanced trade and still find
significant differences between the gains predicted by our model and those by the ACR formula.
We conclude that both trade imbalances and labor market frictions are important contributors to
the divergences we document.
Figure 16: Steady-State Changes in Net Exports in Response to Shocks in Trade Costs
5.4 Globalization Gains
The previous section examined how the consumption gains in our model compare with those from
the ACR formula in response to shocks in trade costs alone. We now ask by how much countries
benefited from all globalization shocks during the period we consider, which include shocks to trade
costs, technology, and intertemporal preferences. To that aim, we adopt the following procedure.
For each country at a time, we neutralize the shocks it experienced between 2000 and 2014, while
feeding the model with the path of shocks faced by the remaining countries. For example, to
assess the effects of globalization on U.S. consumption, we set all U.S. shocks to 1, but we keep
shocks to remaining countries at the values we recovered in Section 5.1. Table V displays the
results. The first column shows that all countries benefited from globalization. China benefited the
most, with consumption gains reaching 6.6%. The Americas and Asia/Oceania gained the least:
0.03%. The magnitude of gains can be significantly affected if we impose trade balance: the second
column shows that gains in the U.S. are reduced from 2.2% to 1.3%. Finally, we investigate the
effect of intertemporal shocks in the third and fourth columns (with and without trade imbalances,
respectively). If we shut down the global savings glut, welfare in the U.S. is significantly higher,
reaching 3.8%. We conclude by observing that even though our results are consistent with the
belief that the global savings glut was detrimental to the U.S., balancing trade would lead to an
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even worse situation.
Table V: Globalization Consumption Gains over 2000–2014
Country Complete Model Balanced Trade
Complete Model Balanced Trade
φ̂ti = 1 ∀i, t φ̂ti = 1 ∀i, t
United States 1.022 1.013 1.038 1.013
China 1.066 1.067 1.056 1.067
Europe 1.015 1.015 1.025 1.016
Asia/Oceania 1.003 1.021 0.997 1.021
Americas 1.003 1.006 1.002 1.006
Rest of the World 1.052 1.045 1.037 1.045
Notes: Each row displays Ŵi (see Equation (44)) in response to extracted shocks to all other countries when
own-country shocks are neutralized. Third and fourth columns impose φ̂ti = 1 ∀i, t, neutralizing all intertemporal
preference shocks. To make the Complete Model exercises comparable with the Balanced Trade ones, we initialize
the Complete Model with NXti = 0 for t = 0.
5.5 The China Shock
As a final application of our model, we investigate the role of China on the adjustment of the labor
market in the U.S. This topic has attracted much academic interest since the work of Autor et al.
(2013) and Pierce and Schott (2016). We compare the behavior of our model when we feed it with
all of the shocks we recovered in Section 5.1 (which we label as the Benchmark counterfactual) to
the behavior of the model when (a) shocks to China are set to be equal to the average of shocks
experienced by the remaining countries, and when (b) we neutralize China’s savings glut by setting
φ̂tChina = 1 for all t.
35 In these simulations, trade imbalances in the initial steady state are set at
NXt=0i = NX
Data
i — that is, the level of trade imbalances in the data in 2000.
We first analyze the situation where shocks to China between 2000 and 2014 are imposed to be
equal to the average of shocks across all of the remaining countries.36 The objective is to understand
the behavior of the global economy in a counterfactual world where Chinese fundamentals evolved
like those of an average country. The red dashed line in Figure 17a shows that China runs a much
more modest trade surplus over time compared to the Benchmark illustrated by the solid blue line.
Interestingly, Figure 17b shows that the behavior of the U.S. trade deficit is barely affected if shocks
to China are set to other countries’ averages. This result suggests that the evolution of the U.S.
trade deficit between 2000 and 2014 was not greatly influenced by the extraordinary shocks China
experienced over this period. Instead, the evolution of the trade deficit in the U.S. was primarily
35Shocks to intertemporal preferences and their interaction with standard shocks in productivities and trade costs
differentiate these counterfactual experiments from Caliendo et al. (2019) and Adão et al. (2020).
36Shocks to trade costs from country i to China are set to be equal to a weighted average of shocks between country
i and all other countries—weights are given by country sizes Li. Shocks to trade costs from China to country i are
set to be equal to the weighted average of shocks between all remaining countries and country i.
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dictated by the full constellation of shocks that the global economy experienced over the 2000s.
This result highlights an important advantage of our multicountry model relative to two-country
models, where changes in the trade balance in one country are mirrored in the other.
Figure 17: The China Shock: Net Exports
(a) NX / GDP in the China (b) NX / GDP in the US
Notes: “All Shocks”: model is fed with all shocks recovered in section 5.1. “China Receives World Avg. Shocks”: model
is fed with all shocks recovered in section 5.1, with the exception of China. For China, productivity and inter-temporal
productivity shocks between 2000 and 2014 are imposed to be equal to the average of these shocks across all the
remaining countries. Shocks to trade costs from country i to China are set to be equal to a weighted average of shocks
between country i and all other countries—weights are given by country sizes Li. Shocks to trade costs from China to
country i are set to be equal to the weighted average of shocks between all remaining countries and country i. “All
Shocks but φ̂China = 1”: model is fed with all shocks recovered in section 5.1 but China’s savings glut by setting
φ̂tChina = 1 for all t. t = 0 corresponds to year 2000. t = 14 corresponds to 2014, the last year of data we employed to
extract the shocks.
Figure 18 describes the impact of the China shock on sectoral reallocation in the U.S. The red
dashed line shows that if shocks to China had behaved in an ordinary way between 2000 and 2014,
the contraction in Mid- and High-Tech Manufacturing would have been less pronounced. The effect
of the China shock on employment in Low-Tech Manufacturing is not as visible, but the dashed
red line is consistently above the solid blue line, showing that shocks to the Chinese economy led
to mild contractions in employment in the sector (or prevented stronger growth in the long run).
In contrast, employment in Agriculture and Services (particularly Low-Tech Services) moved in
opposite directions, quickly absorbing workers displaced from Manufacturing. Figure 19a shows
that the behavior of unemployment with the China shock (solid blue line) or without it (dashed
red line) is very similar. Indeed, in either case, the unemployment rate reaches a maximum of
3.14%.
It is important to highlight that the small response of U.S. unemployment in Figure 19a is not
a mechanical feature of our model. Indeed, Figures 5b, 8b, and 14b show substantial changes in
the unemployment rate in the U.S. and other countries in response to other shocks we simulate.
Further insights can be obtained if we study the behavior of sectoral unemployment. Consider the
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”All Shocks” counterfactual, where we feed the model with all the shocks we extracted in Section
5.1. Figure 19b shows that the response of sectoral unemployment rates is considerably larger
than the aggregate response. Specifically, aggregate unemployment ranges from 3.06% to 3.14% in
response to the extracted shocks. At the sectoral level, unemployment within the manufacturing
sectors responds more strongly and ranges between 3.65% and 4.35%, and unemployment within
agriculture varies between 2.6% and 3.4%. However, unemployment within the service sectors
is essentially unresponsive to the shocks. Therefore, given that 86% of workers are initially in
services, the effect of these shocks on U.S. unemployment is muted. On the other hand, aggregate
unemployment ranges from 6.5% to 12.5% in Europe and from 3.5% and 14% in China, showing
that the model is capable of producing substantial unemployment responses to global shocks.
Figure 18: The China Shock: Labor Allocations in the U.S.
Notes: ”All Shocks”: model is fed with all shocks recovered in section 5.1. ”China Receives World Avg. Shocks”: model is fed
with all shocks recovered in section 5.1, with the exception of China. For China, productivity and intertemporal productivity
shocks between 2000 and 2014 are imposed to be equal to the average of these shocks across all the remaining countries.
Shocks to trade costs from country i to China are set to be equal to a weighted average of shocks between country i and all
other countries—weights are given by country sizes Li. Shocks to trade costs from China to country i are set to be equal to
the weighted average of shocks between all remaining countries and country i. “All Shocks but φ̂China = 1”: model is fed
with all shocks recovered in section 5.1, but China’s savings glut by setting φ̂tChina = 1 for all t. t = 0 corresponds to Year
2000. t = 14 corresponds to 2014, the last year of data we employed to extract the shocks.
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Figure 19: The China Shock: Unemployment in the U.S.
(a) Aggregate Unemployment (b) Sectoral Unemployment
Notes: Panel (A) — “All Shocks”: model is fed with all shocks recovered in section 5.1. “China Receives World Avg. Shocks”:
model is fed with all shocks recovered in section 5.1, with the exception of China. For China, productivity and inter-temporal
productivity shocks between 2000 and 2014 are imposed to be equal to the average of these shocks across all the remaining
countries. Shocks in trade costs from country i to China are set to be equal to the simple average of shocks between country i
and all other countries. Shocks to trade costs from country i to China are set to be equal to a weighted average of shocks
between country i and all other countries—weights are given by country sizes Li. Shocks to trade costs from China to country
i are set to be equal to the weighted average of shocks between all remaining countries and country i. “All Shocks but
φ̂China = 1”: model is fed with all shocks recovered in section 5.1 but China’s savings glut by setting φ̂
t
China = 1 for all t.
t = 0 corresponds to year 2000. t = 14 corresponds to 2014, the last year of data we employed to extract the shocks. Panel (b)
— Behavior of sectoral unemployment rates in response to “All Shocks”.
It is also instructive to compare the behavior of the model when it is subjected to all the global
shocks we extracted in Section 5.1 (the Benchmark) to its behavior when we subject it to the same
shocks but remove China’s saving glut (that is, we set φ̂tChina = 1 for all t). The yellow dotted
line in Figure 17a shows that, in the absence of China’s savings glut, China would have run a
massive trade deficit in the short run, reaching 75% of GDP.37 These large short-run deficits are
then accompanied by large permanent trade surpluses in the long run, surpassing 10% of GDP.
The evolution of the dotted yellow line is unsurprising in light of our discussion in Section 4.2,
and, more specifically, given Figure 7. In anticipation of a much higher level of productivity in the
future (see Figure 9a), China borrows greatly in the short run to smooth consumption over time.
This debt must be repaid in the form of large surpluses in the long run. This result illustrates the
quantitatively important role of shocks to intertemporal preferences φ̂tChina not only in offsetting
these large short-run trade deficits, but also in turning them into surpluses.38
Neutralizing the Chinese savings glut also has important effects on the dynamics of the U.S.
trade deficit. The yellow dotted line in Figure 17b shows that the U.S. trade deficit would be
37In our model, in the absence of shocks to intertemporal preferences, countries perfectly smooth consumption
expenditure over time. This fact gives rise to a surge in imbalances that is not in line with what we observe in the
data. There is ample evidence that the world is far from having perfect consumption smoothing or risk sharing, as
documented and analyzed in Heathcote and Perri (2014).
38If we abstract from intertemporal preference shocks in China, our result is in line with the “allocation puzzle”
in open-economy macroeconomics, in which states that aggregate net capital inflows tend to be negatively corre-
lated with productivity growth across developing countries (Gourinchas and Rey, 2014). In line with this puzzle,
our intertemporal preference shifters could be interpreted as arising from the public sector’s expenditure decisions
(Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013; Aguiar and Amador, 2011; Alfaro et al., 2008).
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significantly smaller in the short run. However, the trade deficit would stabilize at a larger value in
the long run (5% of GDP), as China runs a permanent large trade surplus. This result highlights
that, even in the absence of China’s savings glut, consumption smoothing motives in the global
economy would lead to a large trade surplus in China in the long run (north of 10% of GDP) as
the trade deficit in the U.S. deteriorates to 5% of GDP.
The dotted yellow and solid blue lines in Figure 18 show interesting consequences of China’s
savings glut on the size of the manufacturing sector in the U.S. The Chinese savings glut was
responsible for large declines in U.S. manufacturing in the short run. This behavior is consistent
across all three manufacturing sectors. However, absent the Chinese savings glut, manufacturing
employment in the U.S. would be substantially lower in the long run, as China runs a permanently
large trade surplus, and the U.S. runs a permanently large trade deficit.39
We now turn to the welfare consequences of the China shock. Specifically, we use Equation (44)
to compute the welfare effects of the shocks we recover in Section 5.1 (Benchmark), relative to the
counterfactuals where (a) shocks to China are set to be equal to the average shocks experienced by
the remaining countries: ŴBenchmarki /Ŵ
(a)
i ; and where (b) we neutralize China’s savings glut by




i . By doing so, we are capturing the effect of China’s
shocks relative to a situation where the Chinese fundamentals behaved similarly to the average
global economy (excluding China), and relative to a situation where China did not experience a
savings glut.
Panel A of Table VI shows the effect of the China shock relative to a situation where China
experienced shocks set to the average of the remaining countries. The first column displays the
consumption effects of the China shock in our complete model with trade imbalances. The second
column shows the consumption effects if we impose trade balance period by period. First, note that
all countries benefited from the extraordinary shocks accrued to China. However, these consumption
effects were all very small. Interestingly, the welfare effects of the China shock in the U.S. and the
Rest of the World would be significantly higher if trade balanced every period. Panel B shows
the effect of the Chinese savings glut. Our model predicts that the U.S., Europe, and Asia were
negatively affected by the large shocks to intertemporal preferences in China, but that these effects
were, again, very mild. The exception is the Rest of the World, which actually benefits from the
Chinese savings glut. The Chinese savings glut would have had virtually no consumption effects
around the world under balanced trade.
39These results are in line with the findings of Kehoe et al. (2018) on the effects of the savings glut on structural
change in the U.S.
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Table VI: Global Consumption Gains of the China Shock
(2000–2014)
Panel A. ŴBenchmarki /Ŵ
(a)
i





Rest of the World 1.005 1.031
Panel B. ŴBenchmarki /Ŵ
(b)
i





Rest of the World 1.010 1.000
Notes: Changes in welfare obtained using Equation (44).
ŴBenchmarki refers to all shocks extracted in Section 5.1 fed into
the model. Ŵ
(a)
i refers to these same shocks, but China’s shocks are
set to the average of shocks in remaining countries. Ŵ
(b)
i refers to all
shocks extracted in Section 5.1 fed into the model, but φ̂tChina = 1
for all t. To make the Complete Model exercises comparable with the
Balanced Trade ones, we initialize the Complete Model withNXti = 0
for t = 0.
6 Conclusion
There is a widespread concern among policymakers that, as globalization brings disruption to the
labor market, growing trade deficits can accentuate job losses and the decline of manufacturing.
Given how persistent these concerns have been in the past four decades, it is surprising that trade
economists typically abstract from trade imbalances when they study the labor market conse-
quences of globalization shocks. This paper fills in this gap by extending the workhorse model of
trade (Eaton and Kortum, 2002, and Caliendo and Parro, 2015) to allow for intersectoral mobility
costs (as in Artuç et al., 2010), search frictions (as in Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999), and trade
imbalances (as in Reyes-Heroles, 2016). In short, we extend the state-of-the-art model of trade with
the workhorse models for mobility frictions, unemployment, and trade imbalances. We estimate
the model using data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), the International Labour
Organization’s ILOSTAT, and the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS). Our
estimation method conditions on trade shares and net exports and can be performed country by
country. Even though the parameter space is large, the country-by-country estimation allows us to
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break a large optimization problem into smaller ones.
After analyzing impulse response functions to hypothetical shocks, we find four things: 1)
Incorporating trade imbalances has the potential to significantly magnify the effect of globalization
shocks on intersectoral reallocation and unemployment. 2) Reallocation paths can be substantially
different if we allow for trade imbalances compared to balanced trade—specifically, sectors that
expand in the short run with trade imbalances can instead contract with balanced trade. 3) The
behavior of trade imbalances and of the labor market depends on the whole path of shocks. 4)
The response of unemployment to globalization shocks is not related to signs of imbalances. In
particular, temporary shocks can have important persistent long-run effects in our model, but
none if we impose balanced trade. This motivates us to empirically extract the path of shocks
the global economy actually experienced between 2000 and 2014 using standard methods from the
international trade and macro literatures.
We conduct a standard exercise in the international trade literature and subject the model
to the empirically extracted global technology and trade cost shocks. Aligned with our impulse
response function analyses, we find that allowing for trade imbalances has a first-order effect on the
behavior of labor markets around the world. Next, we investigate how the gains from trade in our
model compare with those obtained using the influential sufficient-statistics approach pioneered
by Arkolakis et al. (2012). We find that both trade imbalances and labor market frictions can
lead to substantial discrepancies between the gains from trade in our model relative to those in
the literature on quantitative models of trade, which is summarized in Costinot and Rodŕıguez-
Clare (2014). Not only are there differences in the magnitude of the gains, but also in their signs.
Relatedly, we assess, for each country, the gains from globalization between 2000 and 2014. Our
model predicts that the U.S. has enjoyed a gain of 2.2% in response to globalization shocks over
this period. Our estimates suggest that these gains would have been 73% larger in the absence of
the global savings glut. However, in a world where balanced trade is imposed, the U.S. would have
experienced 40% smaller gains.
We also use our model to investigate the impact of the “China Shock” on the U.S. trade
deficit and labor market. Consonant with previous literature, we find that shocks to the Chinese
economy contributed to the decline of manufacturing in the U.S., especially Mid-Tech and High-
Tech Manufacturing. However, other sectors of the economy quickly absorbed workers from these
sectors, leading to small effects on unemployment. We also find that shocks to the Chinese economy
had only a modest effect on the evolution of the U.S. trade deficit, highlighting that the evolution
of the U.S. trade deficit was mostly driven by the full constellation of shocks the global economy
experienced. Interestingly, if China had not experienced its savings glut, the U.S. trade deficit
would have been smaller in the short run but larger in the long run.
Our work shows that carefully modeling imbalances can have quantitatively important impli-
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cations for the adjustment process in response to globalization shocks, and it opens important
questions for future work. Given the importance of imbalances for the reallocation process, a
natural question to address next is to quantitatively characterize how trade imbalances shape the
inequality effects of trade. Our model can be extended to allow heterogeneous workers, so this is
a natural next step. In addition, we also hope to be able to add endogenous capital accumulation
decisions and capital-skill complementarity, generating rich mechanisms linking globalization to the
skill premium, as in Reyes-Heroles et al. (2020). Finally, an interesting extension of our framework
would allow workers to make borrowing and savings decisions at the individual level, which would
aggregate into global imbalances. Even though this is a hard problem, especially regarding estima-
tion, we believe that our method of simulated moments that can be performed country by country
(conditional on trade shares and imbalances) can be applied to this situation.
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Artuç, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren, “Trade Shocks and Labor Ad-
justment: A Structural Empirical Approach,” American Economic Review, June 2010, 100 (3),
1008–45.
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Online Appendix, Not for Publication
A Decentralizing the Labor Supply Decision in the Household
Problem
This section shows that the labor supply decision solving (6) subject to (7) and (5) can be decen-
tralized to individual workers solving equations (5) and (9).





















































Because each worker is infinitesimal, and the allocation of one worker does not interfere with the




















































































where φ̂t+1 ≡ φ
t+1
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Using the law of iterated expectations we obtain
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is the value of unemployment in sector k, conditional on the preference shocks ωt`, and
W tk (x) is the value of a job with match productivity x. Note that LtW
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t+1























































Now, wewrite W tk (x) as:
W tk (x) = max{ẽt+1k (.)}
λ̃twtk (x) + ηk










































It is now clear that the optimal policy ẽt+1k (.) is
ẽt+1k (x) =
{















. We therefore have the following Bellman equations:
U tk = Eω






















W tk (x) = λ̃












B Steady State Equilibrium
In this section we derive the equations characterizing the steady state equilibrium. The key con-
ditions that we impose are that variables are constant over time, inflows of workers into each





are constant and equal to 1 in the long run.
Wage Equation
wk,i (x) = βk,iw̃k,ix+



















1− δ (1− χk,i)
















Unemployed workers’ Bellman equation


















































































Price of Composite Sector-Specific Intermediate Good







where Γk,i is a sector and country specific constant.





























= s′i (Li.ui) (A.28)
Product market clearing
Gross Output



























(1− γ`,i) ν`k,iY`,i − µk,iNXi (A.33)





Yk,i = 1 (A.34)














This Section presents the different algorithms we developed to estimate the model and to perform
counterfactual simulations. Section C.1 details the estimation algorithm and Section C.2 obtains
expressions for simulated moments. Section C.3 outlines an exact hat algebra algorithm to compute
changes in the steady state equilibrium in response to shocks in trade costs, productivities, or net
exports. Section C.4 develops the algorithm solving for the transition path of our complete model
with trade imbalances. Section C.5 adapts this algorithm to the case where we have exogenous
deficits. Finally, Section C.6 outlines the procedure we use in Section 5.1 to extract the shocks in
trade costs, productivities, and intertemporal shocks.
C.1 Estimation Algorithm
Define Ik,i (x) ≡
∫ xmax




and a bit of algebra leads
to
































































The rest of the procedure conditions on these values of {Yk,i}.





as parameters to be estimated.
Step 3: Define
$k,i ≡








≥ 1, the free entry condition cannot be satisfied—Ik,i is decreasing.
Abort the procedure and highly penalize the objective function.
Step 4: Find xubk,i so that
(1−(1−χk,i)δ)κ̃k,i
δ(1−βk,i)Ik,i(xubk,i)




= $k,i. If along the algorithm xk,i
goes above xubk,i, we update it to be equal to x
ub
k,i (minus a small number).













, θk,i and uk,i.






































































Step 12: Obtain {Uk,i}.





• Step 12b: Compute until convergence





−Ck`,i + b`,i + θ`,iκ̃`,iλ̃iw̃`,i
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(1−β`,i)




Step 13: Update {Lk,i}.

























• Step 13c: Find allocations Lk,i.
Lk,iuk,i = ϕyk,i
⇒ Lk,i = ϕyk,i/uk,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
ỹk,i
⇒ L′i1K×1 = ϕỹ′k,i1K×1 = Li











Note that in equilibrium,
λ̃iw̃k,ixk,i = (1− δ)Uk,i − ηk,i (A.37)















Step 15: Armed with Lnewk,i and x
new
k,i go to Step 6 until
∥∥∥{Lnewk,i − Lk,i}∥∥∥→ 0 and ∥∥∥{xnewk,i − xk,i}∥∥∥→
0.
Note that
∥∥∥{xnewk,i − xk,i}∥∥∥ → 0 does not imply that (A.37) is satisfied. Therefore, we penalize
deviations from (A.37) in the objective function.
Step 16: Generate moments, compute Loss Function, guess new parameter set Ω and go to Step
3, until objective function is minimized.
Note: Given that we condition on the trade shares πDatak,oi , we can estimate the model country by
country, separately. However, in practice, we will first estimate the model for the U.S. and obtain
all of the U.S. specific parameters. Next, armed with U.S.-specific mobility costs Ckk′ and sector-
specific exogenous exit components χk (we will impose χk,i = χi + χk), we estimate the remaining
countries’ parameters separately, in parallel.















C.2.3 Sector-Specific Average Wages























































































Note that the transition rates in Equation (10) are transitions from unemployment in sector k to
search in sector k′ within period t. There are no data counterfactuals for this variable. However,
we can construct a matrix with transition rates between all possible (model) states between time
t and time t + N (where N is even)—where variables are measured at the ta stage (which is the
production stage). From this matrix, we can obtain N -period transition rates between all states
observed in the data (employment in each of the sectors and unconditional unemployment). First,
we obtain the one-year transition matrix s̃t,t+1 between states {ũ1, ..., ũK , 1, ...,K} . Here, we abuse
notation to mean ũk as sector-k unemployment at the very beginning of a period.


























of those do not find a match that survives
until t + 1. Similarly, the one-year transition rate between sector-` unemployment and sector-k

















According to the timing assumptions of the model, the one-year transition rate between em-
ployment in sector k and employment in sector k′ is zero if k 6= k′. However, the persistence rate
of employment in sector k is given by the probability that a match does not receive a death shock
times the probability that the match is not dissolved because the threshold for production increases
in the following period:
s̃t,t+1kk′,i =
{
0 if k 6= k′
(1− χk,i) Pr
(




if k = k′
. (A.40)




0 if k 6= `
χk,i + (1− χk,i) Pr
(




if k = `
. (A.41)
That is, if a worker is employed in sector k at t, she cannot start the next period unemployed
in sector ` if k 6= `. Otherwise, workers transition between sector k employment to sector k
unemployment if their match is hit with a death shock or if their employer’s productivity goes
below the threshold for production at t+ 1.
We can now write the N -period transition matrix as
s̃t,t+N = s̃t+k−1,t+k × ...× s̃t+1,t+2 × s̃t,t+1, (A.42)






































0 if ` 6= k
(1− χ`,i) if ` = k
s̃`ũk,i =
{
0 if ` 6= k
χk,i if ` = k







































We will be using 0 superscripts to denote the initial steady state, and 1 superscript to denote the
final steady state.

















Note that π0k,oi = π
Data
k,oi .
























































• Step 2d: Compute



















Step 3: If κ̃1k,i ×
1−δ(1−χk,i)
δ(1−βk,i)Ik,i(x1k,i)
≥ 1 abort, set x1k,i so that κ̃1k,i ×
1−δ(1−χk,i)
δ(1−βk,i)Ik,i(x1k,i)
= 1− ε and go
back to Step 1 with this new guess. If κ̃1k,i ×
1−δ(1−χk,i)
δ(1−βk,i)Ik,i(x1k,i)







1− δ (1− χk,i)







κ̃1k,i × 1− δ (1− χk,i)




























































































































Step 10: Compute Bellman Equations:




































































































k,i = (1− δ)U1k,i − ηk,i



























go to Step 2 until
∥∥∥{(L1k,i)new − L1k,i}∥∥∥→ 0 and∥∥∥{(x1k,i)new − x1k,i}∥∥∥→ 0.
C.4 Algorithm: Out-of-Steady-State Transition
















with A0k,i = 1 and d
0




with φ0i = 1 and φ̂
t
i = 1 for T ≤ t ≤ TSS , for some T << TSS .
















for each sector k and country i.













• Step 2a: Compute ̂̃wk,i = w̃TSSk,iw̃0k,i , Âk,i = ATSSk,iA0k,i and d̂k,i = dTSSo,i,kd0o,i,k . Iteratively solve for P̂ Ik,i and




























And obtain πTSSk,oi = π
0
k,oiπ̂k,oi
• Step 2d: Compute













κ̃TSSk,i × 1− δ (1− χk,i)





• Step 2g: Compute Bellman Equations
































, for a small step size λx, and go back to
Step 2d until convergence.





















































. Define x̂t ≡ xt
x0
.





































• Step 3d: Compute for t = 1, ..., TSS − 1:

























k,i (and therefore J
TSS
k,i (s)), start at t = TSS − 1
and sequentially compute (backwards) for each t = TSS − 1, ..., 1.











































> 1, it is not possible to satisfy V tk,i = 0, so that V
t
k,i < 0 and
θtk,i = 0.





































































J tk,i (x) = (1− βk,i) λ̃tiw̃tk,ix+ (1− βk,i) ηk,i
− (1− βk,i)
(




+ (1− χk,i) δφ̂t+1i max
{
J t+1k,i (x) , 0
}





















































Step 6: Start loop over t going forward (t = 0 to t = TSS − 1).






k,i , and θ
t=0
k,i from the initial steady state
computation. Obtain ũtk,i and L
t











































k,i − JCtk,i + JDtk,i
Ltk,i





























































































































t = 1, ..., TSS , for a small step size λw.






























Step 0: Impose a change in a subset of parameters that happens at t = 0, but between tc and td.
That is, the shock occurs after production, workers’ decisions of where to search, and after firms
post vacancies at t = 0. Impose a large value for TSS . Assume that for t ≥ TSS the system will




to 1 for every t.































Step 2: Obtain B0i with respect to the normalization
I∑
i=1









Step 4: Compute steady state equilibrium at TSS , conditional on NX
TSS
i , and the change in
parameter values.





Yk,i = 1. Nor-















, obtained in Step 6, below.




























































. Note that, because B1i is decided at t = 0, before the shock,
R1 = R0 = 1δ .










obtained in Step 6 and Equation (7) compute(
NXti
)′




























Step 9: Update NXTSSi :























with A0k,i = 1 and d
0




with φ0i = 1 and φ̂
t
i = 1 for T ≤ t ≤ TSS , for some T << TSS .











for each country i.





for each sector k and country i.













• Step 3a: Compute ̂̃wk,i = w̃TSSk,iw̃0k,i , Âk,i = ATSSk,iA0k,i and d̂k,i = dTSSo,i,kd0o,i,k . Iteratively solve for P̂ Ik,i and





























and obtain πTSSk,oi = π
0
k,oiπ̂k,oi.
• Step 3d: Compute













κ̃TSSk,i × 1− δ (1− χk,i)





• Step 3g: Compute Bellman Equations:
































, for a small step size λx, and go back to
Step 2d until convergence.





















































. Define x̂t ≡ xt
x0
.





































• Step 4d: Compute for t = 1, ..., TSS − 1:

























k,i (and therefore J
TSS
k,i (s)), start at t = TSS − 1
and sequentially compute (backwards) for each t = TSS − 1, ..., 1.











































> 1, it is not possible to satisfy V tk,i = 0, so that V
t
k,i < 0 and
θtk,i = 0.









































































J tk,i (x) = (1− βk,i) λ̃tiw̃tk,ix+ (1− βk,i) ηk,i
− (1− βk,i)
(




+ (1− χk,i) δφ̂t+1i max
{
J t+1k,i (x) , 0
}





















































Step 7: Start loop over t going forward (t = 0 to t = TSS − 1).






k,i , and θ
t=0
k,i from the initial steady state
computation. Obtain ũtk,i and L
t











































k,i − JCtk,i + JDtk,i
Ltk,i




















































































































to make sure it sums to 1 across sectors and countries.

























for t = 1, ..., TSS , for a small step size αw, and




































for all t = 1, ..., TSS .
















for t = 1, ..., TSS , for a small step size αλ, and





C.6 Algorithm: Recovering Shocks




















—determined in the Outer Loop below.
As before, we denote changes relative to t = 0 by x̂t = x
t
x0









, where T is the last period for which we have data on these variables.























for each sector k and country i.









































And obtain πTSSk,oi = π
0
k,oiπ̂k,oi.
• Step 3d: Compute













κ̃TSSk,i × 1− δ (1− χk,i)





• Step 3g: Compute Bellman Equations:
































, for a small step size λx and go back to
Step 2d until convergence.






















































• Step 4a: For t = T + 1, ..., TSS do the following:

















• Step 4b: Compute P̂F,tk,i for t = 1, ..., TSS − 1 (remember P̂
I,t







• Step 4c: Compute π̂tk,oi and π
t
k,oi for t = T + 1, ..., TSS − 1.
For t = 1, ..., TSS − 1 do:






End of First Case












End of Second Case





















k,i (and therefore J
TSS
k,i (s)), start at t = TSS − 1
and sequentially compute (backwards) for each t = TSS − 1, ..., 1.











































> 1, it is not possible to satisfy V tk,i = 0, so that V
t
k,i < 0 and
θtk,i = 0.


































































k,i , compute J
t
k,i (x):
J tk,i (x) = (1− βk,i) λ̃tiw̃tk,ix+ (1− βk,i) ηk,i
− (1− βk,i)
(




+ (1− χk,i) δφ̂t+1i max
{
J t+1k,i (x) , 0
}





















































Step 7: Start loop over t going forward (t = 0 to t = TSS − 1).






k,i , and θ
t=0
k,i from the initial steady state
computation. Obtain ũtk,i and L
t











































k,i − JCtk,i + JDtk,i
Ltk,i






























































































































t = 1, ..., TSS , for a small step size λw.
















































































Set d̂tk,oi = d̂
T
k,oi for t > T .








































for t = 1, ..., T where EC,0i is aggregate consumption





comes from the data.















for t = 1, ..., T − 1
Set φ̂ti = 1 for t ≥ T + 2. The value of φ̂
T+1
i will depend on E
C,TSS
i and will be recovered in Step 7.
Note: the value of φ̂t=1i does not matter. Individuals made decisions at t = 0 assuming φ̂
t=1
i = 1,
as the economy was assumed to be in steady state at t = 0.
Step 4: Obtain B0i with respect to the normalization
I∑
i=1





Step 5: Make initial guess for NXTSSi (with respect to the normalization
I∑
i=1











k,i , and d̂
TSS
k,oi .





Yk,i = 1. Nor-















, obtained in Step 9, below.




































for t = 0, ..., T , as in Step 0
EC,TSSi for t = T + 1, ..., TSS




i for at t ≥ T + 1 (Euler equation)



















































































obtained in Step 9.
Step 12: Update NXTSSi :













for small step sizes λo and λA.










In this section, we display the complete set of parameter estimates.
Table A.1: Final Expenditure Shares µk,i
Sector ↓ Country → USA China Europe Asia/Oceania Americas ROW
Agr. 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09
LT Manuf. 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
MT Manuf. 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.1 0.11
HT Manuf. 0.1 0.15 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.1
LT Serv. 0.3 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.39
HT Serv. 0.51 0.25 0.41 0.41 0.4 0.29
Table A.2: Labor Shares in Production γk,i
Sector ↓ Country → USA China Europe Asia/Oceania Americas ROW
Agr. 0.45 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.62 0.67
LT Manuf. 0.37 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.27
MT Manuf. 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.37 0.32 0.28
HT Manuf. 0.39 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.25
LT Serv. 0.61 0.37 0.49 0.54 0.56 0.48
HT Serv. 0.62 0.55 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.68
Table A.3: Input-Output Table—Average across Countries 1N
∑
i νk`,i
User ↓ Supplier → Agr. LT Manuf. MT Manuf. HT Manuf. LT Serv. HT Serv.
Agr. 0.267 0.079 0.118 0.138 0.26 0.139
(0.056) (0.019) (0.036) (0.029) (0.06) (0.07)
LT Manuf. 0.195 0.376 0.043 0.081 0.223 0.082
(0.047) (0.064) (0.009) (0.015) (0.041) (0.04)
MT Manuf. 0.222 0.066 0.287 0.106 0.225 0.095
(0.034) (0.017) (0.04) (0.022) (0.052) (0.044)
HT Manuf. 0.022 0.157 0.067 0.463 0.184 0.106
(0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.052) (0.044) (0.05)
LT Serv. 0.057 0.136 0.105 0.101 0.343 0.259
(0.042) (0.03) (0.027) (0.034) (0.073) (0.11)
HT Serv. 0.007 0.076 0.033 0.11 0.267 0.507
(0.005) (0.023) (0.019) (0.071) (0.069) (0.171)
Note: Standard deviation of νk` across countries.
Table A.4: Mobility Cost Estimates Ck`
From ↓ / To → Agr. LT Manuf. MT Manuf. HT Manuf. LT Serv. HT Serv.
Agriculture 0 0.825 1.560 0.454 0.189 1.676
LT Manufacturing 0.414 0 0.005 0.000 0.799 2.034
MT Manufacturing 2.033 0.000 0 0.002 0.866 2.646
HT Manufacturing 0.015 0.001 0.003 0 0.276 0.917
LT Services 0.268 0.972 1.221 0.466 0 0.002
HT Services 0.790 1.826 2.150 1.201 0.004 0
Table A.5: Sector-Specific Utility and Variance Estimates ηk,i, σ
2
k,i
Sector ↓ / Country → USA China Europe Asia/Oceania Americas ROW
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT Manuf. -0.383 -0.943 -0.428 -0.521 -0.588 -0.316
MT Manuf. 0.026 -0.566 -0.245 -0.229 -0.195 -0.072
HT Manuf. -0.551 -1.557 -0.743 -0.607 -1.292 -0.934
LT Services 0.085 -0.454 -0.382 -0.236 -0.405 -0.588
HT Services -0.052 -0.467 -0.603 -0.518 -0.894 -1.011
σ2US 0.727








Low Tech Man 0.005
Sector Med Tech Man 0.014
Component χk High Tech Man 0.002
Other Services 0.008
Hi Tech Services -0.001







Table A.8: Vacancy Posting Cost Estimates κ̃k,i
Sector ↓ / Country → USA China Europe Asia/Oceania Americas ROW
Agriculture 0.539 0.450 0.451 0.664 0.451 0.452
LT Manuf. 0.632 0.810 0.681 0.865 0.809 0.583
MT Manuf. 0.472 0.615 0.549 0.660 0.540 0.447
HT Manuf. 0.698 0.984 0.821 0.922 1.076 0.830
LT Services 0.449 0.617 0.592 0.660 0.649 0.639
HT Services 0.511 0.674 0.672 0.840 0.872 0.813
